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Abstract
I study a case of market sharing agreements to provide evidence of coordination
between colluding firms on the degree to which they compete against each other
(henceforth referred to as head-to-head competition) and their bidding behavior. I
also quantify the impact that coordinating head-to-head competition has on pro-
curement costs. My focus is on the two largest firms bidding in provincial road
paving procurement auctions in Quebec between 2007 and 2015. I use the po-
lice investigation into collusion and corruption in the Quebec construction industry
launched in October 2009 to capture the end of this cartel. I find that after this
date, the two suspected firms i) were more likely to bid in the same auction and
ii) submitted significantly lower bids when they competed in the same auction. A
structural model of entry and bidding shows that if the firms had kept competing
head-to-head at the same rate as in the collusive period but had stopped colluding
on bids, bids would have increased by about 3.86% with respect to the competitive
scenario observed after the police investigation began. This finding suggests that
there were additional procurement costs associated with firms coordinating on the
degree of head-to-head competition.
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1 Introduction
Researchers have devoted considerable attention to the study of price collusion (see for
instance Porter and Zona, 1993, 1999; Bajari and Ye, 2003; Kawai and Nakabayashi,
2018; Clark et al., 2018). Yet less attention has been paid on the impact that other types
of coordination have on prices. One of these other types of coordination between firms
consists in adjusting the degree to which they compete against one another (henceforth
referred to as head-to-head competition). In a market for differentiated products, for
example, there can be collusion between firms not only on prices but also on the sets of
products that these firms offer in an effort to lessen competition and share the market
amongst themselves (Sullivan, 2017). In the same way, in procurement auctions firms can
collude by coordinating their participation in auctions.
In this paper, I study a case of market sharing agreements i) to find evidence of
coordination between firms on the degree of head-to-head competition and evidence of
coordination on bids and ii) to quantify the impact that coordinating head-to-head com-
petition has on procurement costs. I focus on two firms alleged to have reached market
sharing agreements in the road paving procurement market in the Canadian province of
Quebec.
In the market for provincial road paving contracts awarded by the Quebec Ministry of
Transportation between 2007 and 2015, these two firms are the largest in terms of both
the number of asphalt plants that they own and the number of contracts that they won.
The Commission of Inquiry on the Awarding and Management of Public Contracts in
the Construction Industry (henceforth referred to as the Commission), which investigated
collusive practices in the construction industry, has provided evidence that these two
firms coordinated i) their degree of head-to-head competition and ii) their bids once they
decided to compete head-to-head.1,2
1See Charbonneau and Lachance (2015), p.531
2Legal disclaimer: This paper analyzes market sharing agreements from a strictly economic point of
view. It is based on the analysis of publicly available contracts, testimony transcripts, and the final report
from the Commission. Begun in 2015, the investigations of these allegations by the Canadian Competition
Bureau are still ongoing. Newspapers have reported that the Canadian Competition Bureau obtained
search warrants to investigate these firms. See Le´vesque (2015).
1
In the road paving procurement market, firms face considerable transportation costs
because they must bring asphalt from their plants to paving project locations. This means
that there are two margins on which firms can coordinate head-to-head competition. First,
colluding firms can coordinate relative to the location of their asphalt plants. To avoid
head-to-head competition, they can place these asphalt plants at a certain distance from
one another. Second, they can decide to avoid head-to-head competition when they are
close to the paving project location by alternating their participation in the auctions.
Both margins allow colluding firms to coordinate the degree of head-to-head competition
and thus share the market amongst themselves.
My empirical analysis is based on an original dataset for paving contracts awarded
between 2007 and 2015. I constructed the dataset using publicly available contracts listed
on the official tendering website of the Quebec government (Syste`me E´lectronique d’Appel
d’Offres, SEAO). These contracts contain information on the auction outcomes (indicating
both winning and losing bids) and on the number and the identities of the participants in
every auction. The auctions are first-price (lowest price) sealed bid auctions. I expand the
auction data by providing information on the geographic location of the asphalt plants
that I obtained from the Quebec Ministry of Transportation.
To begin the analysis, I use the start of the police investigations into collusion and
corruption in the Quebec construction industry launched in October 2009 to capture
the end of this cartel. The beginning of these investigations predated by two years the
Commission and this makes it possible to identify a pre-October 2009 (suspected collusive)
period and post-October 2009 (competitive) period in the dataset. In this way, it is
possible to test whether there were significant changes between the two periods in i) the
degree of head-to-head competition (the probability that the two suspected firms bid on
the same contract) and in ii) the level of bids.
A descriptive analysis shows that head-to-head competition increases by about 8%
between the pre-investigation and post-investigation periods, and that the bids of the two
cartel firms conditional on bidding decrease by about 15.43% of the value of the contract.
I do not find a significant change in terms of the location of the firms’ asphalt plants.
The lack of significant changes in the location of the asphalt plants is probably due to the
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availability of a relatively short sample period. For construction firms, where to locate an
asphalt plant is typically a long-run decision.
To find causal evidence that the observed differences in head-to-head competition
and bidding were driven by the start of the police investigation, I use a difference-in-
difference design that compares the outcomes of treated auctions with the outcomes of a
control group of auctions. A treated auction is one in which the two cartel firms could
have potentially competed. I describe an auction as potentially competitive if the asphalt
plants of the two cartel firms were close enough to the paving project location in order for
both of them to have participated in the auction and to have bid competitively. I choose
a radius of 100 kilometers around the paving project location. This choice is justified by
the average distance of firms bidding in these procurement contracts.
The results show that the increase in the probability of head-to-head competition was
significantly greater in the potentially competitive auctions than in the control group
of auctions. Finally, the average winning bid decreased by 13% after the start of the
investigation in the potentially competitive auctions than in the control group of auctions.
Given that the average value of contracts was about C$2 million before the start of the
investigation, this means that the average winning bid was C$260,000 higher during this
period. Back-of-the-envelope calculations indicate the savings for the Quebec Ministry of
Transportation to be C$14.3 million per year after the end of the cartel.
The descriptive analysis fails to distinguish between the impact that avoiding head-
to-head competition has on procurement costs and the impact that coordinating bids has
on these costs. It is important to determine which part of the decrease in procurement
costs should be attributed to coordination on bids and which part should be attributed
to coordination on head-to-head competition. In a cartel that does not include all the
firms in the market, the two types of coordination have a different impact on procurement
costs.
To quantify the extent to which restricting head-to-head competition increased pro-
curement costs, I use a structural model of entry and bidding that allows for the existence
of asymmetric bidders in the assumed competitive period, that is, the period after the
start of the investigation into collusion. I consider a counterfactual scenario in which
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firms continue to compete head-to-head at the same rate as in the collusive period, but
submit competitive bids. In this counterfactual scenario, the average bid would have been
3.86% higher than the average bid observed in the competitive period. Thus there are
extra procurement costs associated with this type of coordination. About 30% of the
average bid increase observed before the start of the police investigation is due to firms
coordinating the degree of head-to-head competition. The remaining 70% is due to firms
coordinating bids.
Colluding firms avoid head-to-head competition for various reasons. First, the magni-
tude of the entry cost, that is those costs incurred by firms when they submit a bid. Sec-
ond, in avoiding head-to-head competition, colluding firms face a less aggressive bidding
strategy from bidders that are not part of the cartel. The bidding strategy in first-price
auctions depends in fact on the number of bidders. Finally, when colluding firms avoid
head-to-head competition, the bidder in the cartel with the lowest cost does not have to
worry about preventing another cartel member from cheating. Thus the cartel firm with
the lowest cost can bid less aggressively (Marshall and Marx, 2007).
This study is among the first to show that multiplant firms acting in multiple mar-
kets can share the market by colluding not only to set prices but also to determine the
degree of head-to-head competition. Sullivan (2017) was the first to empirically analyze
coordination on the degree of head-to-head competition in the US ice cream industry. In
Sullivan (2017), the degree of head-to-head competition is represented by the extent to
which firms produce the same varieties of ice cream. In my study, the degree of head-to-
head competition is represented by the extent to which firms compete against one another
in auctions. However, my study differs from Sullivan (2017) in several ways. First, I use
an exogenous event to capture the end of the coordination on the degree of head-to-head
competition between firms. This event was the starting point for a series of investigations
into collusion and corruption in the Quebec construction industry. Similarly, Clark et al.
(2018) show that this event affected the bidding behavior of colluding firms in the city of
Montreal. Second, my study analyzes a market with different characteristics. In the road
paving market colluding firms have two ways to avoid head-to-head competition: they can
collude to determine the locations of their asphalt plants and they can decide whether or
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not to participate in the same auction when their asphalt plants are fairly close to the
location of the paving project. Sullivan (2017) does not investigate whether firms sell ice
cream in different supermarkets, which would be equivalent to colluding on the location
of the asphalt plants. Finally, I identify several possible drivers of collusion on the degree
of head-to-head competition.
This study contributes to the empirical literature on multimarket contact and collu-
sion. Following Bernheim and Whinston (1990), empirical studies have shown that the
higher the frequency of interactions, the greater the likelihood of collusion; but to the
best of my knowledge no empirical study has taken into account the degree of compe-
tition between multimarket firms as a strategic choice of these firms. Belleflamme and
Bloch (2004) is the first theoretical study that endogenizes multimarket contact. Belle-
flamme and Bloch (2004) establish that firms can implement market sharing agreements
by colluding to determine the degree of head-to-head competition (the number of contacts
between firms).3
This study also extends the empirical literature on collusion in public procurement
auctions (Porter and Zona, 1993, 1999; Pesendorfer, 2000; Bajari and Ye, 2003; Asker,
2010; Conley and Decarolis, 2016; Kawai and Nakabayashi, 2018; Clark et al., 2018; Chas-
sang et al., 2019; Chassang and Ortner, 2019). The studies most closely related to mine
are Porter and Zona (1999), Pesendorfer (2000) and Clark et al. (2018). Porter and Zona
(1999) provide a statistical test to determine the presence of collusion acting through
territorial allocation or through complementary bidding, and they find evidence of the
latter form of collusion in the Ohio school milk market. Pesendorfer (2000) compares a
cartel based on market sharing agreements and a cartel based on sidepayments, but he
does not investigate the participation behavior of firms in the cartel. Clark et al. (2018)
focus on municipal asphalt contracts for asphalt awarded by the two biggest cities in the
Canadian province of Quebec, examining an all-inclusive cartel and the impact that the
entry deterrence of firms outside the cartel had on bids. In this study, I empirically test
3The theoretical predictions in Bernheim and Whinston (1990) have been tested in various industries:
Pilloff (1999) tests them for the banking industry, Jans and Rosenbaum (1997) for the cement industry,
and Evans and Kessides (1994) and Ciliberto and Williams (2014) for the airline industry. The most
relevant study of multimarket contact and collusive behavior in procurement auctions is Gupta (2001).
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for the causal impact of the police investigation on the participation behavior of cartel
firms, quantifying the impact that coordinating the participation behavior had on bids.
In addition, I examine the ex post procurement performance (see for instance Decarolis
and Palumbo, 2015; Coviello et al., 2017; Giuffrida and Rovigatti, 2018). In particular, I
analyze the final amount paid by the Quebec Ministry of Transportation once a paving
project had been completed to verify whether greater competition had unintended conse-
quences on the ex post procurement performance. After colluding firms stop coordinating,
they may accept a larger degree of head-to-head competition and submit more aggressive
bids at the time of the awarding of a contract. Yet when executing the project, they
may incur cost overruns that increase the final procurement costs forecast at the time of
the signing of the contract. This pattern is not, however, observed in the data. Thus
competition effectively improves the overall procurement costs.
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the publicity
requirements and the adjudication process for the auctions together with a description
of the cartel allegations faced by paving companies. Section 3 presents the data and
summary statistics for all the firms in the market and for the two cartel firms analyzed.
Section 4 examines whether the increase in head-to-head competition and the decrease in
bids of the cartel firms observed between the collusive and the competitive periods could
be attributed to the start of the police investigation. Section 5 introduces the structural
model of entry and bidding used to quantify the extent to which avoiding head-to-head
competition increased bids. Section 6 draws some general conclusions.
2 Institutional background and the investigation into
collusion
2.1 Publicity requirements and adjudication process
According to the Act Respecting Contracting by Public Bodies (in French Loi sur Les
Contrats des Organismes Publics), construction contracts awarded by ministerial bodies
with an estimated value above C$100,000 must be publicly advertised on the Quebec
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government’s electronic tendering website (SEAO). These contracts must also be awarded
through an open auction. Only Quebec firms or firms coming from a province that has a
commercial agreement with the province of Quebec are allowed to bid.4
Contracts are awarded through open tenders using the mechanism of first-price sealed
bid auctions where the firm with the lowest bid wins. For the type of activities involved,
such as transportation and production of asphalt, a contract has multiple tasks and each
firm participating in an auction has to bid a unitary price for the quantities indicated
by the Ministry for each task.5 The final bid is the sum of the products of the price
and the quantities for each of the tasks described in the contract. Each bid has to meet
conformability and admissibility requirements. One of the conformability requirements is
the submission of a warranty that should be equal to either 5% or 10% of the submitted
bid.
The winning bid is usually equal to the amount for which the contract is signed. The
only cases in which the contract amount is different from the final amount are those
contracts where, at the time of the awarding, the Ministry asks for the renegotiation of
the contract and the bidder agrees with the renegotiation. Finally, there is no reserve
price in these auctions.
2.2 The investigations into collusion
On October 15, 2009, a TV program called Enqueˆte reported that collusion was widespread
in the construction industry in Quebec, especially in the City of Montreal. According to
the report, collusive practices inflated the amounts paid for public works by about 30% in
the city of Montreal.6 Following this report, a police operation called Ope´ration Marteau
4The electronic tendering website has published calls for tender for the award of ministerial contracts
since February 2005. For municipalities, it has been mandatory to publish calls for tender on the SEAO
only since April 2011.
5The Ministry of Transportation has different regional departments (one for each Quebec adminis-
trative region) that each year check the status of the roads under their administration and submit their
request to the central administration. The central administration then looks at the priorities and fills in
the final plan (contracts to award, whether to use an open or restricted auction according to the value of
the contract). Thus the location of the paving project is subject to the priorities of the Ministry and its
budget constraints.
6See Enqueˆte, Radio Canada (2009).
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was launched by the Quebec government to investigate allegations of collusion, corruption
and possible relationships between firms and organized crime.
Two years later, the Commission of Inquiry on the Awarding and Management of Pub-
lic Contracts in the Construction Industry was created on October 19, 2011 to analyze the
allegations of collusion and corruption in the various sectors of the construction industry.
The Commission’s mandate was to find evidence of collusion and corruption in the con-
struction industry and to make recommendations on the awarding and management of
public contracts. After completing its investigation, the Commission issued a final report
in November 2015.7
In the final report, a whole chapter was dedicated to contracts awarded by the Ministry
of Transportation of Quebec. The report provided evidence of a market segmentation
scheme based on the locations of the asphalt plants of two firms (firm A and firm B in
my analysis). These two firms agreed on sharing the market by putting asphalt plants far
away from each other. Since the distance of a firm’s closest asphalt plant to the paving
project location is a major cost factor affecting competition in this industry, the two firms
avoided competing against each other.8
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the asphalt plants of firms A and B as they appeared
in 2006 (one year before the start of the sample) in each administrative region of Quebec.
In four of these regions we observe plants owned by firm A as well as plants owned by
firm B; and in most of the remaining regions, the distribution of the plants belonging to
the two firms is such that they are too far away from each other to make competition
between the firms possible. Since we do not observe significant changes in the number
of asphalt plants owned by the two firms and in the distances between these plants, it is
impossible to determine whether these firms coordinated their plant location choices or
whether these firms were simply geographically differentiating.9
7See Charbonneau and Lachance (2015).
8An executive of firm A admitted the existence of a market sharing agreement with firm B. The two
firms coordinated their participation and their bidding behavior in open auctions administered by the
Ministry of Transportation of Quebec. See Be´dard (2014), pp. 20-24.
9The map in Figure 1 does not show the entire province of Quebec. I have excluded in my analysis
the two most northern regions of the province where there are few inhabitants and few viable roads.
These regions have a low population density of less than 1 inhabitant per km2. Figure A.3 in Appendix
A.4 shows the Canadian province of Quebec and its location in Canada.
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Figure 1: Geographic map of asphalt plants of firms A and B for all Quebec administrative
regions in 2006
Firm A (35)
Firm B (20)
Since 2015, the Bureau has focused its attention on 18 firms (among those, firms A
and B) suspected of having shared the market, having allocated territories and having
rigged the bids between 1982 and 2011 in the road paving market. Some firms’ plants were
searched in March 2015. The name of the firms involved were not publicly released, but
newspapers reported that firms A and B were among them.10 According to newspapers,
the Canadian Competition Bureau affirmed that the cartel was active in five administra-
tive regions. Four of these five administrative regions are regions where firms A and B
had at least one plant and where their plants were close to each other.11
3 Data and summary statistics
The dataset includes contracts above C$100,000 awarded by the Ministry of Transporta-
tion of Quebec through open auctions between 2007 and 2015. The Quebec Ministry
of Transportation awarded road paving contracts for a total value of C$1.46 billion be-
tween 2007 and 2015 through the process of calls for tenders with an yearly average of
C$162 million. The database is obtained by merging two different datasets. The first
is obtained by scraping the contracts from the Official Tendering website of the Quebec
10See Le´vesque (2015).
11Table A.1 in Appendix A.1 shows that for the other 16 firms involved in the searches, the number
of times they bid with either firm A or firm B (or both) did not increase. In Table A.2 I run a difference-
in-difference where I put all suspected firms in the treatment group and observe that if firms A and B
are removed from the sample, I obtain a non-significant drop in the winning bids.
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government. The second is obtained by downloading data on all contracts awarded by the
Quebec public administration in the open data website of the Quebec government. This
second dataset allows me to verify whether the contracts included paving as a principal
component of the construction work.12
A total of 751 contracts were kept. These contracts include the description of the job,
the name of firms participating and their bids, the code identifying the type of job, the
location of the job, the date when the contract was published and the date of the award
of the contract. A nice feature of these data is that both winning bid and losing bids are
reported together with the identity of the firms participating in the auction. On the other
hand, the dataset includes only an interval of the ex ante estimated value of the contract
because the precise value is confidential information. In the descriptive and structural
analysis, I use the mean value of the contract. It is the mean of the upper and lower
bounds of the interval indicating the value of the contract.
I augmented the auction data with asphalt plant data. The Ministry of Transportation
issued (in 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2014) a detailed map showing not only the location
of the asphalt plants of each firm but also the main shareholders of the firm together
with the total number of plants owned by each firm. With this additional information, I
compute the distance between the location of the paving project and the closest asphalt
plant of each firm.13
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the pre-investigation (2007-2009) and post-
investigation (2010-2015) periods. There are 86 different firms bidding in at least one
auction and 51 firms winning at least one auction. Auctions receive on average three
bids. There is a substantial number of auctions with one bidder, equal to 13.3% of the
number of contracts in the dataset. The maximum number of bidders is equal to 9, and
72.4% of auctions in the dataset have between 2 and 4 bidders. The number of bidders
does not change substantially in the two time periods considered. From the table we can
observe a decline in the average and winning bids between the two periods considered,
while the mean value of the contracts is approximately constant around C$2 million.
12https://www.donneesquebec.ca/recherche/fr/dataset/systeme-electronique-dappel-doffres-seao.
Since the open data begin in 2009, I cannot verify the scraped data for 2008 and 2007.
13More details on the data cleaning process are in Appendix C.1.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for pre-investigation and post-investigation period.
Pre (2007-2009) Post (2010-2015)
Number of firms 58 73
Number of winning firms 36 45
Total contracts awarded 194 557
Total value contracts (C$ millions) 392.10 1064.14
Total value contracts by year (C$ millions) 130.70 177.36
Mean value contract (C$ millions) 2.02 1.91
Average number of bidders 3.04 2.95
Average bid (C$ millions) 1.60 1.27
Average bid (% value contract) 84.51 76.88
Average winning bid (C$ millions) 1.46 1.16
Average win bid value (% value contract) 81.34 72.08
Notes: Pre (2007-2009) is the period before the start of the police investigation (October 2009).
Post (2010-2015) is the period after the start of the police investigation (October 2009). Number of firms
indicates the number of firms bidding in at least one auction. Number of winning firms indicates the
number of firms winning at least one auction. Total value of contracts awarded (C$ million) indicates
the total value of contracts (C$ millions) awarded in the period expressed as the sum of all mean values
of the contracts. Total value of contracts awarded by year (C$ million) indicates the average total value
of contracts (C$ millions) awarded by year. Average value of contract indicates the average value (C$
millions) of a contract. Average number of bidders indicates the average number of bidders in an auction.
Average bid (C$ million) is the average bid expressed in C$ millions. Average bid (% value contract)
indicates the average bid expressed in % of the value of the contract. Average winning bid (C$ million)
indicates the average winning bid expressed in C$ millions. Average winning bid (% value contract)
indicates the average winning bid expressed in % of the value of the contract.
3.1 Firms
In the road paving market, a firm’s location is a key strategic decision given that trans-
portation is a relevant component of costs in this industry; firms have to produce asphalt
and transfer it to the place where the job is undertaken.14This characteristic makes com-
petition in this market localized. Multiplant firms are thus more likely to win ministerial
contracts than firms with a small number of plants. Each firm also faces capacity con-
straints: a firm cannot afford more than a certain amount of work within a certain period
of time.
14Bajari and Ye (2003) underline the importance of transportation costs in these types of industries
in the analysis of seal-coating contracts.
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Table 2 shows summary statistics for the ten firms with the highest participation rates
in the market. The market is characterized by firms that bid occasionally and firms that
own multiple plants and bid in many auctions. Since paving projects can be located
across the whole province of Quebec, owning more plants allows a firm to have higher
participation rates. There are only 9 firms bidding in more than 50 auctions, and only 4
bidding in more than 100 (including firms A and B). Firm A is the leading firm in the
market and owned twice the number of plants of firm B in 2006. Firms A and B have the
highest participation rates in the market. For the 76 firms with the lowest participation
rates, the average participation rate is only 1%. These firms win, on average, 24% of the
auctions in which they participate in.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of firms bidding in Quebec road paving contracts (2007-
2015).
ID Firm Participation (%) Win/Participation (%) Distance (km) Plants
A 70.57 48.68 38.69 41
B 45.01 31.07 45.02 21
C 17.98 38.52 51.14 9
D 21.57 40.12 42.85 6
E 12.52 32.98 44.94 6
F 12.92 28.87 30.19 6
G 11.45 13.95 44.23 3
H 8.26 25.81 38.53 10
I 7.19 14.81 49.70 3
L 6.52 10.20 45.17 1
Notes: ID Firm indicates an anonymous identifier replacing the actual name of a firm in the dataset.
Participation rate (%) indicates the number of contracts in which a given firm participates over total
contracts. Win/Participation (%) indicates the total number of contracts won over the total participation
rate of a firm. Distance (km) represents the average distance of the firm from the project location of the
auction. Plants indicates the number of asphalt plants for each firm in 2006 for the whole province of
Quebec.
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3.2 Cartel firms’ statistics
Table 3 shows summary statistics for firms A and B for the periods pre-October 2009 and
post-October 2009. Firm A has a higher participation rate than firm B over the whole
sample period. The internal division of the aggregate market shares seems to correspond
until 2009 to what the executive of firm A testified in front of the Commission, that is,
a division of 2/3 and 1/3 for the collusive years. I observe that the % of head-to-head
competition out of total contracts increases by about 8% while the reduction in bids
of firms A and B when they compete head-to-head is 15.43% of the mean value of the
contract in the period post-October 2009.
Table 3: Summary statistics for firms A and B for pre-investigation and post-investigation
periods
Pre (2007-2009) Post (2010-2015)
Participation firm A 65.46 72.35
Participation firm B 42.27 45.96
Market share A 24.71 38.73
Market share B 16.72 11.94
Number asphalt plants A 35.00 36.00
Number asphalt plants B 20.00 25.00
Head head (% total contracts) 23.20 31.24
Average bid (% value) when head-to-head 88.87 73.44
Notes: Pre (2007-2009) refers to the period before the start of the police investigations (Operation
Marteau). Post (2010-2015) refers to the period after the start of the police investigations. Participation
firm refers to the percentage of contracts out of total contracts where cartel firms participate. Market
share firm refers to the market share of the cartel firm as percentage of total value in the period. The
total value in the period is calculated summing all the winning bids. Head-to-head competition (% total
contracts) is the percentage of contracts where firms A and B both participate out of total contracts.
Average bid (% value) when head-to-head is the average bid expressed in % of the mean value of the
contract for those contracts where firms A and B are both bidding.
From Figures 2 and 3 we can observe on the map that the increase in the % head-to-
head competition for firms A and B is higher in regions where plants of both firms are
close to each other.15
15The location of asphalt plants in Figure 2 represents the one observed in 2006, while the location of
asphalt plants in Figure 3 represents the one observed in 2015.
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Figure 2: % head-to-head competition out of total contracts and plant location of firms
A and B by Quebec administrative regions (pre-investigation period, 2007-2009)
90−100 80−90 70−80
60−70 50−60 40−50
30−40 20−30 10−20
0−10 No obs. Firm A plant
Firm B plant
Figure 3: % head-to-head competition out of total contracts and plant location of firms
A and B by Quebec administrative regions (post-investigation, 2010-2015)
90−100 80−90 70−80
60−70 50−60 40−50
30−40 20−30 10−20
0−10 No obs. Firm A plant
Firm B plant
From the descriptive statistics, the following facts can be observed:
• An increase in the % of head-to-head competition after the start of the investigation,
• An increase in the % of head-to-head competition in those administrative regions
of Quebec where both firms had at least one asphalt plant at the beginning of the
sample period considered,
• A decrease in bids of cartel firms when they compete head-to-head (15.43% of the
mean value of the contracts).
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The increase in head-to-head competition and the decrease in bids could have also been
driven by other factors different from the police investigation. To account for this, in the
next section I propose a difference-in-difference design to identify whether the start of
the police investigation had a causal effect on the increase in the degree of head-to-head
competition and the drop in bids submitted by firms A and B.
4 Descriptive analysis
4.1 Identification strategy
I identify the causal effect of the end of the cartel on the two main outcomes analyzed,
that is, the probability of head-to-head competition and the bids submitted by firms
A and B when they compete head-to-head. I want to establish whether the increase in
head-to-head competition and the decrease in bids were caused by the police investigation.
To capture the effect, I employ a difference-in-difference strategy. I compare two
different groups of auctions, a “treated” and “control” group to analyze significant changes
in the probability of head-to-head competition between the two cartel firms and their
bids. I define the treated group of auctions in terms of potential competition i) at the
bidding stage, and ii) at the participation stage. Thus, I define an auction as potentially
“competitive” if the two cartel firms are located within a 100 km radius around the
paving project awarded with the auction. I chose a radius of 100 km because it reflects
the average distance that firms participating in these auctions have to cover to reach the
paving project location. The average distance of participating firms in the dataset is 45
km and the average distance of participating firms in the treated group of auctions is 41
km. Interestingly, the median distance of participating firms is 35 km and is identical to
the median distance of participating firms in the treated group of auctions.16
Figure 4 shows examples of my identification strategy. it shows the location of firm A
(orange circle), the location of firm B (black circle) and the location of the paving project
(green triangle). The boundaries represent the boundaries of an administrative region
16In Appendix B.3 I show that the results are robust i) to the choice of a radius of 90 km (Tables B.9
and B.10), ii) to the choice of a radius of 110 km (Tables B.11 and B.12).
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in Quebec. Since the plant location could be itself a strategic choice of firms, I cannot
exploit the location of a firm in a given administrative region. Using the radius allows me
to overcome this endogeneity problem.
Figure 4a shows one case of treated auctions. Both cartel firms have at least one plant
located within a 100 km radius around the paving project awarded with the auction.
Figure 4b shows a case of an auction in the control group in which one of the cartel firms
is located outside a 100 km radius around the project.
Figure 4: Location of the paving project (green triangle), of firms A (orange circle) and
B (black circles) in an administrative region of Quebec
100 km
(a) Treated auction
100 km
(b) Control auction
4.2 Head-to-head competition
Table 4 reports the probability of head-to-head competition for the two groups of auc-
tions (treated and control). There is a lower probability of head-to-head competition for
projects considered in the control group of auctions. Since I built my empirical strategy
on the identification of treated auctions as the ones with higher potential competition
between cartel firms, in the control group the probability of head-to-head competition for
the cartel firms is close to 0. The two groups are thus not comparable on this dimension.
On the other hand, observing a higher gap in the difference between the two groups in the
probability of head-to-head competition after the start of the police investigation could
signal that the investigation affected the participation behavior of cartel firms in those
auctions in which they could be potential competitors. The difference between the two
groups increases from 0.35 to 0.45.
Table 5 reports instead the average number of bids from cartel firms in an auction.
Consistently with Table 4, the average number of cartel bids in the treated auctions
relative to the control group of auctions increase after the start of the police investigation.
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Table 4: Probability head-to-head
Pre Post Post-Pre
TreatedAuction=1 0.354 0.470 0.115
TreatedAuction=0 0.000 0.016 0.016
Post-Pre 0.354 0.454 0.100
Table 5: Number of cartel bids
Pre Post Post-Pre
TreatedAuction=1 1.260 1.396 0.136
TreatedAuction=0 0.731 0.782 0.051
Post-Pre 0.528 0.613 0.085
Next, I investigate whether these results are robust to the inclusion of other contract
characteristics. The econometric specification is the following:
Ya = β0 + β1TreatedAuctiona × Posta + β2TreatedAuctiona + β3Posta + β4Za + a (1)
where Ya is the measure of head-to-head competition (the number of cartel bids in an
auction). The variable TreatedAuction is equal to 1 if the two cartel firms are located
within a 100 km radius around the project, 0 otherwise. The variable Post indicates
whether the auction was published after October 2009, and Za represents a set of auction
characteristics: i) the number of potential cartel bidders (firms A and B); ii) the number
of potential bidders outside the cartel (firms other than A and B); iii) a proxy for the
demand, that is the total value of contracts awarded up to auction a as % of the total
value of the contracts awarded in a given administrative region of Quebec and year; iv)
dummies identifying the administrative region of project location of the auction, the year
of publication of the auction and the value of the auction’s project. Capacity constraints
could be also another potential confounding factor. That is why I include a variable that
represents the highest level of free capacity of cartel firms in a given region and year to
control for possible capacity constraints.
Since one of the contract characteristics is the number of potential bidders (cartel and
non-cartel bidders), I need to identify a set of potential participants for which I do not
have data. Thus, I rely on a proxy for potential competition at the participation stage.
Unlike Li and Zheng (2009), the dataset does not provide any information on the number
of firms that downloaded the call for tender on the electronic tendering website. I define
a firm as a potential participant if it has ever bid in an auction nearby. I associate nearby
auctions with the smallest geographic unit I can identify for the paving project. This
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geographic unit is the regional county municipality, in French municipalite´ re´gionale de
comte´ (from now on MRC). A MRC is a supra-local type of regional municipality and it
groups different municipalities. If a firm has bid at any time in any auction in a given
MRC, the firm is considered a potential participant.17
Table 6: Diff-in-diff for the number of cartel bids in an auction and probability of head-
to-head competition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep.Variable prob.head-to-head prob.head-to-head nbr.cartel bids nbr.cartel bids
TreatedAuction×Post 0.0999 0.222*** 0.0847 0.231**
(0.0817) (0.0510) (0.138) (0.116)
TreatedAuction 0.354*** -0.0377 0.528*** -0.0169
(0.0628) (0.0491) (0.114) (0.115)
Post 0.0155 -0.0222 0.0510 -0.0585
(0.0112) (0.110) (0.0949) (0.161)
N potential cartel bidders 0.0970*** 0.262***
(0.0287) (0.0548)
N potential non-cartel bidders -0.00556 -0.0302*
(0.00971) (0.0173)
Free capacity of cartel firms (%) -0.000164 -0.000573
(0.000424) (0.000822)
Demand (%) -0.000403 -0.00114
(0.000524) (0.00104)
Admin Region effects No Yes No Yes
Year effects No Yes No Yes
Size project effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 751 751 751 751
R-squared 0.209 0.479 0.202 0.494
Average Outcome Treated Pre 0.354 0.354 1.260 1.260
Notes: Standard errors clustered by Quebec administrative region and year in parentheses. nbr.
cartel bids indicates the number of cartel bids in an auction. prob head-to-head is a binary variable
indicating whether both cartel firms (firms A and B) bid in the auction. Post is a dummy equal to 1 if
the contract is published after October 2009. N potential cartel bidders is the number of cartel bidders
(firms A and B) bidding in at least one auction in a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale de comte´). N
potential non cartel bidders is the number of bidders (other than firms A and B) bidding in at least one
auction in a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale de comte´). Free capacity of cartel firms (%) is the highest
level of free capacity (%) of cartel firms in a given administrative region and year. Demand (%) is the
total value of contracts awarded up to auction a as % of the total value of the contracts awarded in a
given administrative region of Quebec and year. Significance at 10% (*), at 5% (**), and at 1% (***).
17This procedure is similar to that of Athey et al. (2011) and Conley and Decarolis (2016).
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Table 6 reports the results of the estimation of equation 1. After the start of the
police investigation, the number of cartel bids increases by about 0.22 with respect to
the control group of auctions, once I control for contract characteristics. The increase is
about 63% of the average outcome observed in the pre-investigation period in the treated
group. The results are similar if I consider as outcome the number of cartel bids in an
auction.18
4.3 Bids
In the last part of the descriptive analysis, I show the impact of the police investigations
on bids. The bids are expressed in % of the mean value of the contract. Table 7 and
Table 8 report the results for the treated and control group of auctions. On average, bids
decrease in the treated group of auctions by about 11.29% and winning bids decrease by
about 13.11% of the contract value. In the control group of auctions, the bids on average
remain at the same level between the two periods considered.
Table 7: Bids as % of the value of the
contract
Pre Post Post-Pre
TreatedAuction=1 86.680 75.391 -11.289
TreatedAuction=0 79.756 81.588 1.831
Post-Pre 6.923 -6.197 -13.120
Table 8: Winning bids as % of the value
of the contract
Pre Post Post-Pre
TreatedAuction=1 83.137 70.027 -13.110
TreatedAuction=0 77.932 75.940 -1.993
Post-Pre 5.205 -5.913 -11.118
I investigate whether these results are robust with the inclusion of other contract and
bidder characteristics. The econometric specification is the following:
Bidia = β0+β1TreatedAuctiona×Posta+β2TreatedAuctiona+β3Posta+β4Xia+β5Za+ia
(2)
where Bidia is the bid submitted by firm i in auction a (as% of the mean value of the
contract). The variable TreatedAuction is equal to 1 if both cartel firms are within a
18Tables A.5 and A.6 in Appendix A.3 report the results for the test of the common trend assumption
for the two groups of auctions considered. If I interact the dummy variable indicating the treated group
of auctions with a linear trend (Year), I reject the parallel trend assumption. On the other hand, if I
interact the dummy variable indicating the treated group of auctions with year dummies, I cannot reject
the hypothesis that the coefficient of Treated×2008 is equal to the coefficient of Treated×2009.
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radius of 100 km around the paving project awarded with auction a, 0 otherwise. The
variable Post indicates whether the auction was published after October 2009, while the
variables Xia and Za represent respectively bidder and contract characteristics. Bidder
characteristics are i) capacity, ii) distance of the closest asphalt plant from the project
location, iii) the value of contracts won up to auction a in a given administrative region
and year. Contract characteristics are the number of potential cartel and non-cartel
bidders, demand and the dummies related to the year of publication of the auction and
related to the location of the auction (administrative region).
Table 9 reports the results. Columns 1-3 report the estimates for bids (winning and
losing bids), and columns 4-6 report the estimates only for winning bids. In all the
different specifications there is a negative and significant coefficient for the treated group
of auctions compared to the control group, in line with what we found in Table 7 and
Table 8. The bids in the treated group of auctions decrease by about 14.8% of the mean
estimated value of the contract compared to auctions in the control group. The decrease
in bids represents 15% of the average bid observed in the pre-investigation period in the
treated group of auctions. The observed decrease in the bids is robust to the inclusion of
relevant cost factors of firms, such as their distance from the project (in km) and their
capacity. The decline in bids is also robust to other contract characteristics, such as the
number of contracts awarded in a given administrative region and year and the number
of potential competitors. For the average bids, there seems to be a significant impact of
the number of contracts previously won by a given firm. This variable represents firm’s
economies of scale (the more contracts a firm wins in a region, the lower they will bid
in the following contracts). The winning bids decrease by about 13% of the value of the
contract. 19
19Table A.7 reports the tests for the presence of a linear common trend for the two groups of auctions
before the start of the investigation. The null hypothesis of a linear common trend in the pre-investigation
period for the treated and control groups of auctions is only weakly rejected if we consider all bids but it
is not rejected if we consider only the winning bids.
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Table 9: Diff-in-diff for bids over value of the contract (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep.Variable all bids all bids winning bids winning bids
TreatedAuction×Post -13.12** -14.77** -11.12** -12.93**
(5.550) (5.929) (5.076) (5.623)
TreatedAuction 6.923 12.81** 5.205 12.41**
(4.334) (4.999) (4.227) (5.027)
Post 1.831 11.07 -1.993 9.116
(4.623) (7.961) (3.799) (6.389)
Distance (km) 0.0364** 0.0356
(0.0175) (0.0245)
Capacity (%) 0.0237 0.0196
(0.0381) (0.0769)
Value firm region (%) -0.110* 0.00534
(0.0563) (0.113)
N potential cartel bidders -6.713** -3.924
(2.963) (2.642)
N potential non-cartel bidders 0.543 -0.306
(0.970) (0.843)
Demand (%) 0.0818* 0.0151
(0.0468) (0.0463)
Admin Region effects No Yes No Yes
Year effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,230 2,230 751 751
R-squared 0.0186 0.0522 0.0267 0.0554
Average Outcome Treated Pre 86.68 86.68 83.14 83.14
Notes: Standard errors clustered by Quebec administrative region and year in parentheses. Post
indicates whether auction a was published after October 2009. Distance (km) is the driving distance
between the project location and the firm‘s closest plant to the project. Capacity (%) is the percentage of
the total value of contracts won up to auction a over total value of contracts won in a given administrative
region and year. Value firm region (%) is the total value of contracts won by the bidder up to auction
a over the total value of contracts awarded in a given administrative region and year (in percentage). N
potential cartel bidders is the number of cartel bidders (firms A and B) bidding in at least one auction in
a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale de comte´). N potential non-cartel bidders is the number of bidders
(other than firms A and B) bidding in at least one auction in a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale de
comte´). Demand (%) is the total value of contracts awarded up to auction a as % of the total value of
the contracts awarded in a given administrative region of Quebec and year. Significance at 10% (∗), 5%
(∗∗), 1% (∗∗∗) p < .01.
Considering the average value of a contract equal to C$2 million, firms in the treated
group of auctions are winning by submitting bids that are about C$260,000 lower than
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those observed in the pre-investigation period. This implies an average saving for the
public administration of about C$14.3 million per year after the investigation started.
Appendix B.1 shows several robustness checks. In Table B.1 I replicate Table 9 using
the upper bound of the interval identifying the estimated value of the contract as a measure
to normalize bids. In Table B.2 I exclude auctions with only one bidder. In Table B.3
I control for the number of actual bidders, instead of the number of potential bidders.
Finally, in Table B.4 I include firm fixed effects. The decrease in bids is even stronger if
we include in the treated group of auctions only those auctions where firm A and firm B
compete head-to-head (Table B.5) and if we only consider in the treated group only the
bids of firms A and B when they compete head-to-head (Table B.6).
4.4 Other outcomes
The investigation could have also impacted other variables. In this section, we investigate
other auction-level outcomes such as i) the number of bids excluding firms A and B
(in other words, the number of non-cartel bids), ii) the probability that an auction has
only one bidder, iii) the probability that firms other than A and B win the auction. In
particular, one bidder auctions are a sign of lack of competition (The Economist , 2016).
Table 10 shows that after the investigation, the probability of observing auctions with
one bidder goes down significantly while the probability the number of bidders outside
the cartel significantly increases.
Another important dimension that I want to investigate is the ex-post procurement
performance. Once a cartel stop coordinating bids and participation behavior in auctions,
firms previously in the cartel could adjust their behavior by delaying the end of paving
projects and thus incurring in cost overruns. Table 10 shows that this is not the case in the
auctions I analyze (column 5). On the other hand, we find that firms complete projects
related to treated auctions faster after the start of the police investigation (column 4).
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Table 10: Diff-in-diff for additional outcomes at the auction level (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep.Variable nbr. non-cartel bids 1-bidder auction prob. non-cartel win delays overrun
TreatedAuction×Post 0.748*** -0.126** 0.0194 -219.4** 1.904
(0.143) (0.0554) (0.0678) (100.9) (1.859)
TreatedAuction -0.368** 0.0372 0.0958* 107.6 -1.397
(0.153) (0.0542) (0.0570) (109.4) (1.789)
Post -0.723** 0.188 -0.237* -608.8*** -13.67***
(0.312) (0.119) (0.133) (133.8) (2.470)
N potential cartel bidders -0.185* 0.00717 -0.112**
(0.0944) (0.0450) (0.0473)
N potential non-cartel bidders 0.225*** -0.0184** 0.0401***
(0.0329) (0.00913) (0.0102)
Demand (%) -0.00368*** 0.000763** -0.000135
(0.00117) (0.000319) (0.000571)
Admin Region effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size project effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Observations 751 751 751 534 567
R-squared 0.636 0.300 0.230 0.496 0.273
Average Outcome Treated Pre 1.921 0.0472 0.559 1187 1.533
Notes: Standard errors clustered by Quebec administrative region and year in parentheses. Post
indicates whether auction a was published after October 2009. Distance (km) is the driving distance
between the project location and the firm‘s closest plant to the project. N potential cartel bidders is the
number of cartel bidders (firms A and B) bidding in at least one auction in a given MRC (municipalite´
re´gionale de comte´). N potential non-cartel bidders is the number of bidders (other than firms A and B)
bidding in at least one auction in a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale de comte´). Demand (%) is the
total value of contracts awarded up to auction a as % of the total value of the contracts awarded in a given
administrative region of Quebec and year. Delays are expressed as the difference between the day when
the contract has been signed and the date of termination. Overrun is the difference between the amount
at which the contract is signed and the final amount paid by the Quebec Ministry of Transportation,
expressed as % of the amount at which the contract is signed. Significance at 10% (∗), 5% (∗∗), 1% (∗∗∗)
p < .01.
5 The effect of the increase in head-to-head compe-
tition on bids
The results presented in the previous section show that head-to-head competition in-
creased and bids decreased after the start of the police investigation in the Quebec con-
struction industry. The econometric model was not capable of capturing whether the
higher level of the bids observed before the start of the investigation was due to firms A
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and B avoiding head-to-head competition or coordinating bids. Determining which part
of the higher procurement costs should be attributed to coordination on bids and which
part should be attributed to coordination on head-to-head competition is important. In
a cartel that does not include all the firms in the market, the two types of coordination
can have a different impact on procurement costs.
To quantify the extent to which restricting head-to-head competition increased pro-
curement costs, I propose two approaches: a reduced form and a structural one. To
determine the impact that coordination on the degree of head-to-head competition has
on bids, I mimic a situation in which the two firms suspected of collusion compete head-
to-head at the same rate as under the collusive regime observed before October 2009.
5.1 Reduced-form approach
In Table 11 I estimate a model in which I exclude all auctions awarded in MRCs where one
of the two cartel firms participated for the first time after the start of the investigation.
For example, suppose that firm A was the only bidder in the MRC of Montreal until
October 2009. If firm B started bidding in Montreal after October 2009, I drop the
auctions in Montreal in which firm B bids. The results obtained are almost identical to
those observed in Table 9. This implies that the effect of coordination on the degree of
head-to-head competition is on average smaller relative to the effect of coordination on
bids.
The reduced-form approach presents different issues. First, it considers the decision of
firms to participate in an auction as exogenous. Second, in some of the MRCs both cartel
firms were already active bidders in the period pre-investigation but they simply competed
head-to-head to a lower extent. This second aspect cannot be captured with a reduced-
form approach. Finally, an additional reason is related to the entry effect established by
Li and Zheng (2009). They show that the probability of entry decreases with the number
of potential bidders. Thus bids do not always decrease with an increase in competition
because bidders are more willing to participate when facing a lower number of potential
opponents.
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Table 11: Diff-in-diff for bids over value of the contract (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep.Variable all bids all bids winning bids winning bids
TreatedAuction×Post -13.85** -14.21** -10.97** -12.47**
(5.693) (6.083) (5.171) (5.729)
TreatedAuction 6.923 10.47** 5.205 10.73**
(4.335) (4.893) (4.228) (5.056)
Post 2.455 10.84 -1.699 9.120
(4.715) (8.212) (3.841) (6.696)
Distance (km) 0.0485** 0.0342
(0.0194) (0.0262)
Capacity (%) 0.0123 0.0267
(0.0387) (0.0824)
Value firm region (%) -0.0875 0.00306
(0.0572) (0.129)
N potential cartel bidders -3.890 -0.941
(2.440) (2.323)
N potential non-cartel bidders -0.496 -1.016
(0.953) (0.837)
Demand (%) 0.0616 -0.00297
(0.0472) (0.0465)
Admin Region effects No Yes No Yes
Year effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,906 1,906 678 678
R-squared 0.0203 0.0493 0.0247 0.0538
Average Outcome Treated Pre 86.68 86.68 83.14 83.14
Notes: Standard errors clustered by Quebec administrative region and year in parentheses. Post
indicates whether auction a was published after October 2009. Distance (km) is the driving distance
between the project location and the firm‘s closest plant to the project. Capacity (%) is the percentage
of total value of contracts won up to auction a over total value of contracts won in a given administrative
region and year. Value firm region (%) is the total value of contracts won by the bidder up to auction
a over the total value of contracts awarded in a given administrative region and year (in percentage). N
potential cartel bidders is the number of cartel bidders (firms A and B) bidding in at least one auction in
a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale de comte´). N potential non-cartel bidders is the number of bidders
(other than firms A and B) bidding in at least one auction in a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale de
comte´). Demand (%) is the total value of contracts awarded up to auction a as % of the total value of
the contracts awarded in a given administrative region of Quebec and year. Significance at 10% (∗), 5%
(∗∗), 1% (∗∗∗) p < .01.
5.2 Structural model of entry and bidding
To make the participation decision of firms endogenous, I employ a structural model of
entry in auctions and bidding that models the entry decision and bidding behavior as
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endogenous. I can simulate a counterfactual scenario in which firms A and B coordinate
the degree of head-to-head competition and do not coordinate their bids. While in the
data there is a scenario in which firms coordinate the degree of head-to-head competition
and bids (the period before the start of the police investigation) and a scenario in which
firms A and B do not coordinate the degree of head-to-head competition and bids (the
period after the start of the police investigation), the scenario in which firms A and B
coordinate only the degree of head-to-head competition is not observed.
To identify the effect of coordination on the degree of head-to-head competition on
bids, I use a model of entry in an auctions and bidding that strictly follows Athey et al.
(2011) and Gugler et al. (2015). The model is based on the following assumptions. First,
the model has two steps: the individual decision of each firm to participate in an auction
(step 1) and the decision on the bid level once the firm decides to participate (step 2).
In line with the firm statistics presented in Table 2, the model allows for the existence
of asymmetric bidders, since there are differences between the two cartel firms and, more
generally, between almost every firm in terms of participation behavior and the number
of asphalt plants they own in the province of Quebec. I adopt a parametric assumption
on the bid distribution. I assume, again strictly following Athey et al. (2011) and Gugler
et al. (2015), that bids are distributed according to a Weibull distribution. With asym-
metric bidders and given the nature of the counterfactual experiment, putting parametric
assumptions on the bid distribution makes the estimation of counterfactual bids easier.
Finally, the model is estimated using auctions from the competitive period, i.e. the period
after October 2009, and I assume independent private costs.
5.2.1 The model
The model can be characterized as a two-stage game. In the first stage, firms choose
whether or not to participate in the auction. In the second stage, only firms that decided
to participate in the first stage bid in the auction. The preparation of the bid is a costly
activity. Each bidder willing to participate in an auction has to pay a submission warranty;
and, before submitting the final bid, each firm has to estimate the price offered for each
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task in the contract (the price per ton of asphalt or the transportation cost of asphalt,
for example).
Participation and bidding are independent activities because the participation stage
only determines at the bidding stage the number of firms effectively participating. Since
the model is characterized by a two stage game, it is solved by backward induction. For the
bidding process, a standard first-price sealed-bid auction setting is adopted. Bidders are
risk neutral and each bidder i draws his own private cost ci for completing the project from
his own distribution Fi(.). At the bidding stage, participating firms already know how
many bidders n they face out of a set of potential bidders N, and each bidder maximizes
its own profit:
pii(ci, bi, n) = (bi − ci)
∏
j∈n\i
[1− Fj(b−1j (bi);n)] (3)
where 1−Fj(b−1j (b);n) = 1−Gj(b;n) is the probability that j will bid higher than b and
the inverse bidding strategy b−1j (b) is equal to the cost of player j, called cj. Maximizing
with respect to bi, we can find the first-order condition of the problem, which is the
following:
1
bi − ci =
∑
j∈n\i
gj(bi;n)
(1−Gj(bi;n) (4)
The asymmetric equilibrium bidding is characterized by the following equation:
bi(ci, n) = ci +
1∑
j∈n\i
gj(bi;n)
(1−Gj(bi;n)
(5)
which depends on the firm’s own cost and the opponents’ bid distribution and density of
bids.
At the entry stage, a potential bidder i decides whether or not to enter in the auction.
Each bidder enters the auction if its expected profits from entering are higher than its
entry costs. In other words,
Πi(p) =
∑
n⊂N
pii(n)Pr[n|i ∈ n] ≥ Ki (6)
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where Ki is the entry cost, pii(n) is the ex ante markup from the auction, and Pr[n|i ∈ n]
is the probability that n bidders out of N potential bidders enter the auction if bidder i
enters. Although the model is more flexible since it allows for asymmetric bidders and for
bidder-specific entry costs, the asymmetric participation equilibrium exists, but it need
not be unique. The result has been established by Li and Zhang (2015) who discuss this
problem in detail. In my model, I assume that the participation probabilities come from
a unique equilibrium.
5.2.2 Identification
As in Guerre et al. (2000) (GPV), it is possible to directly identify the cost ci of each
bidder from the observed bids and their distribution. Here, I apply a parametric version
of GPV. In an auction with a set of contract characteristics Z, number of potential cartel
bidders Nc, number of potential bidders outside the cartel Nnc, number of actual bidders
in the cartel nc and those outside the cartel nnc, the estimated cost of bidder i with
characteristics X is given by
cˆi = bi − 1∑
j∈N\i
gˆj(bi|X,Z,Nc,Nnc,nc,nnc)
(1−Gˆj(bi|X,Z,Nc,Nnc,nc,nnc)
(7)
The participation probability pi is directly identifiable from the data. Owing to the
variation in the number of potential bidders (both in the cartel and outside the cartel),
entry costs are also identifiable. I estimate these costs to check whether the relevance
of these entry costs explains the reluctance of head-to-head competition in the collusive
period. To do so, I find an expression for the expected profits through the estimation
of the participation probabilities of each firm and the repeated simulations of auction
outcomes in which each firm participates as in Athey et al. (2011).
5.2.3 Estimation
In the first stage, firms decide whether or not to participate in the auction. The partic-
ipation decision is a binary choice variable that takes value 1 if equation (6) is satisfied.
The distribution of bidders’ participation is binomial. This binomial distribution has a
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parametric (logit) specification that allows estimating the predicted participation of each
firm:
pi(X,Z,Nc, Nnc) =
exp(α1X + α2Z + α3Nc + α4Nnc)
1 + exp(α1X + α2Z + α3Nc + α4Nnc)
(8)
With the logit estimation, I can obtain the predicted probabilities of participation for each
firm in each auction. With these probabilities, I simulate 1000 times the participation
behavior in a given contract. The participation of potential bidders in an auction is sim-
ulated 1000 times using individual predicted participation probabilities for each potential
bidder. Thus, 1000 new samples of auctions are obtained.
At the subsequent bidding stage, participants choose their bid bi which is dependent on
their cost ci given the number of bidders entering the auction n ⊆ N . Costs are estimated
through the method proposed by Guerre et al. (2000) with parametric assumptions on
the distribution of bids. As in Athey et al. (2011), a Weibull distribution has been chosen
for bids:
Gi(bi|X,Z,Nc, Nnc, nc, nnc) = 1− exp (− bi
λi(X,Z,Nc, Nnc, nc, nnc)
)ρi(X,Z,Nc,Nnc,nc,nnc) (9)
where the parameters of the distribution λi and ρi depend on a set of bidder characteristics,
auction characteristics and the number of potential and actual bidders in the cartel and
outside the cartel. These two parameters are linearized and estimated through maximum
likelihood.
Given the 1000 different samples of auctions obtained and the estimated bid distribu-
tion parameters, for each participation draw we can find the empirical distribution and
density of bids for each bidder in order to recover the estimated cost cˆi given by
cˆi = bi − 1∑
j∈n\i
gˆj(bi|X,Z,Nc,Nnc,nc,nnc)
(1−Gˆj(bi|X,Z,Nc,Nnc,nc,nnc))
(10)
with empirical distribution Fˆi(cˆi|X,Z,Nc, Nnc, nc, nnc). The variables representing the
bidder characteristics are the capacity, the value of contracts won by the firm in a given
administrative region up to the auction, and the firm’s own distance from the paving
project. The set of contract characteristics include dummies for year of publication of the
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auction, dummies identifying the administrative region of location of the paving project of
auction a, and the value of contracts awarded up to auction a in a given region and year.
The number of potential bidders in the cartel is defined as the number of bidders (firms
A and B) bidding at least once in the post-investigation period in a given MRC where
the paving project is located. The number of potential non cartel bidders is the number
of bidders other than firms A and B bidding at least once in the whole post-investigation
period in a given MRC where the paving project is located.
5.2.4 Results
Table 12 reports the estimates of the parameters in equation 8 using the observed bidder
participation. The capacity, contracts won and the firm’s own distance enter the partic-
ipation decision in the expected way. The higher the occupied capacity, the lower is the
probability of participating in an auction. The higher the distance from the project, the
lower is the probability of participation. The higher the value of contracts won (a proxy
capturing economies of scale), the higher is the participation probability. In addition, the
probability of participation is negatively influenced by the number of potential non-cartel
bidders. This effect is similar to the one found in Li and Zheng (2009), who estimate a
negative relationship between the number of potential and actual bidders in the auction.
The number of potential cartel bidders is not significantly correlated with the probability
of participation.
Table 12 reports also the estimates of bid parameters λi (the scale of distribution) and
ρi (the shape of the distribution). The only significant parameters for the scale of the
distribution are the demand and number of potential and actual bidders. If the value of
contracts awarded in a given administrative region and year is higher, firms bid higher.
This might be due to the fact that the higher the number of awarded contracts, the more
firms are likely to reach their capacity constraints. The negative coefficient of the number
of potential cartel bidders shows that if firms A and B are potential competitors, the
competitive pressure is higher, causing bids to be lower. The number of actual cartel bids
is another factor influencing the bid distribution. If both cartel firms bid in the auction,
there is a downward pressure on bids (as expected).
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Table 12: Determinants of entry and parameters of the bid distribution
Dep.Variable entry λ ρ
Distance (km) -0.0150*** 0.0301 0.00129
(0.00101) (0.0208) (0.00153)
Capacity (%) -0.000861 0.00571 -0.00230
(0.00180) (0.0416) (0.00299)
Value firm region (%) 0.0590*** -0.125 0.00423
(0.00572) (0.0813) (0.00599)
N potential cartel bidders -0.0512 -10.93*** -0.187
(0.109) (2.416) (0.214)
N potential non-cartel bidders -0.241*** 1.969*** 0.0647
(0.0307) (0.692) (0.0525)
actual cartel bidders -4.174** -0.255
(1.898) (0.164)
actual non-cartel bidders 0.479 0.169*
(1.029) (0.0911)
Demand (%) -0.0100*** 0.123*** 0.000925
(0.00145) (0.0344) (0.00286)
Admin Region effects Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Size project effects Yes No No
Observations 3,351 1,553 1,553
Pseudo R2 0.2110
Log-pseudolikelihood -7431.4414
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Distance (km) is the driving distance between the project
location and the firm‘s closest plant to the project. Capacity (%) is the percentage of total value of
contracts won up to auction a over total value of contracts won in a given administrative region and
year. Value firm region (%) represents the total value of contracts won by the bidder up to auction a
over total value of contracts awarded in a given administrative region and year (in percentage). Demand
(%) is the total value of contracts awarded up to auction a as % of the total value of the contracts
awarded in a given administrative region of Quebec and year. N potential cartel bidders is the number
of cartel bidders (firms A and B) bidding in at least one auction in a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale
de comte´).N potential non-cartel bidders is the number of bidders (other than firms A and B) bidding in
at least one auction in a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale de comte´). n cartel bidders is the number
of cartel bidders (firms A and B) bidding in the auction. n non-cartel bidders is the number of bidders
(other than firms A and B) bidding in the auction. Significance at 10% (∗), 5% (∗∗), 1% (∗∗∗) p < .01.
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Finally, I estimate entry costs. I take an average of firms’ profits across simulations
of each contract and multiply these profits by the probability of participation found by
estimating equation (6). The median participation cost is 14% of the average bid. The
relevance of these entry costs is one of the factors motivating coordination on the degree
of head-to-head competition between cartel firms.
5.2.5 Counterfactual: The relative importance of coordinating head-to-head
competition with respect to coordinating bids
As counterfactual experiment, I simulate an unobserved scenario where firms collude on
the degree at which they compete head-to-head. In this way, I establish what would have
been the price effect if firms were allowed only to collude on the degree of head-to-head
competition. To implement this counterfactual scenario, I use the participation proba-
bilities of the cartel firms observed in the pre-investigation period, assuming that firms
outside the cartel keep the same participation probabilities they had in the competitive
period. Then, I simulate competitive bidding under this alternative scenario.
When I use the participation probabilities of cartel firms in the pre-investigation pe-
riod, I have to consider one issue. The baseline estimation of the previous section computes
the participation probabilities that are firm-auction specific. For the counterfactual, in or-
der to find the participation probability in the pre-investigation period, I use the empirical
frequencies of participation of these two firms at the MRC level.
The steps for the estimation of the counterfactual experiment are as follows:
• For cartel firms, I compute the empirical frequencies in the pre-investigation period
(2007-2009) in a given MRC.
• I leave the participation probabilities of firms not in the cartel as those estimated
in the competitive period.
• I simulate participation in 1000 replications of a contract.
• I keep the parameters of the bid distribution equal to those estimated in the com-
petitive period.
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• I adjust the number of potential cartel bidders and actual cartel bidders to that
observed in the collusive period.
• I attach all draws and find the counterfactual average bid as the mean of all average
bids in the different 1000 draws.
The 1000 samples produce a counterfactual average bid of 79.54% of the mean value of
the contract. The counterfactual average bid is 3.86% higher with respect to the average
bid that was estimated from the actual data. The effect of the coordination on the degree
of head-to-head competition is low if compared to the effect on prices of coordination in
bids. It accounts for 30% of the overall effect of collusion on bids. The small magnitude of
this effect could be due to two factors going in opposite directions. With fewer potential
bidders, the competition effect suggests that prices should increase, since bidding is less
aggressive. However, there is an entry effect going in the opposite direction. Because
of this second effect, bidders would be more willing to participate when they face fewer
potential rivals (Li and Zheng, 2009).
5.3 Discussion
In the structural exercise, I found that the effect of coordinating head-to-head competition
accounts for a small part of the average increase in bids observed in the collusive period.
This pattern could be at odds with the fact that, in principle, the two effects should not
be different. I explain why colluding firms prefer to coordinate the degree of head-to-head
competition rather than coordinating on bids.
5.3.1 Entry costs
The entry costs are the costs incurred by firms when they prepare the submission of a
bid. Through the structural model, the median entry cost is estimated to be 14% of the
average bid. Part of these entry costs comes from the fact that the Quebec Ministry of
Transportation requires all bidders willing to participate in an auction to submit 5 or 10%
of the submission as warranty. The submission warranty is a real cost for firms, as it is
money frozen for a certain period of time.
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5.3.2 Bidding behavior of bidders not in the cartel
Bidders not in the cartel respond to realized competition. In a cartel that does not
include all firms in the market, colluding firms could potentially prefer to avoid head-to-
head competition because the designated winner within the cartel faces in expectation a
less aggressive bidding strategy by the firms outside the cartel. Suppose that we observe
an auction in which there are three potential bidders: two bidders are in the ring and
one bidder is outside the ring. If the two colluding firms avoid head-to-head competition,
the one firm in the ring designated to participate in the auction faces less aggressive
bidding by the bidder outside the ring compared to the case in which both firms in the
ring participate in the auction.
To support this idea, Table 13 shows the relationship between bids and the number
of bidders in an auction. The relationship is negative and significant if I consider all bids
and also if I consider only the bids of firms different from A and B. All bidders, and in
particular bidders other than firms A and B, respond to realized competition.
5.3.3 Bid coordination is weaker than the bid selection mechanism
Marshall and Marx (2007) have shown that, in first-price auctions, a bidding ring can sup-
press competition from other firms in the ring if the ring is able to control ring members’
bids (what they call a bid selection mechanism). By avoiding head-to-head competition,
firms in the cartel implement the strongest case of bid selection mechanism. On the other
hand, a ring that relies on a bid coordination mechanism does not have the ability to
perfectly control all ring members’ bids. That is why in this mechanism the bidder in the
ring with the lowest cost should bid aggressively not to let a ring member with the lowest
cost cheat on the agreement.
Given all the possible reasons that make colluding firms choose to avoid head-to-head
competition with respect to coordinating bids, it is not rational for them to avoid head-
to-head competition in every auction. If colluding firms avoided competing against each
other in every auction, this would clearly be a red flag for collusion. In this particular case,
for antitrust authorities, it is easy to understand that firms coordinate their participation
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behavior, ruling out the possibility that they do not compete in an auction for other
reasons, such as capacity constraints. In some parts of Quebec, for example, the two
firms are so close to each other that it is suspicious if they decide to avoid competing
against each other. In one administrative region, for example, the two firms are located
only 3 km away from each other. In that region, it is difficult to avoid head-to-head
competition in every auction.
Table 13: OLS estimation for bids as % of the mean value of the contract over the number
of bidders
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep.Variable all bids all bids non cartel bids non cartel bids
n cartel bidders -4.924** -4.110* -5.698*** -5.339**
(2.165) (2.267) (2.168) (2.271)
n non-cartel bidders -0.538 -0.588 -0.353 -0.0503
(1.087) (1.558) (1.162) (1.766)
Distance (km) 0.0373** 0.0305
(0.0177) (0.0199)
Capacity (%) 0.0243 0.0342
(0.0385) (0.0446)
Value firm region (%) -0.121** -0.159*
(0.0574) (0.0909)
Demand (%) 0.0832* 0.0877*
(0.0484) (0.0497)
Admin Region effects No Yes No Yes
Year effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,230 2,230 1,362 1,362
R-squared 0.00974 0.0431 0.0145 0.0521
Average Outcome Pre 84.51 84.51 83.95 83.95
Notes: Standard errors clustered by Quebec administrative region and year in parentheses. n cartel
bidders is the number of cartel bidders (firms A and B) bidding in the auction. n non-cartel bidders is
the number of bidders (other than firms A and B) bidding in the auction. Distance (km) is the driving
distance between the project location and the firm‘s closest plant to the project. Capacity (%) is the
percentage of total value of contracts won up to auction a over total value of contracts won in a given
administrative region and year. Value firm region (%) is the value of contracts won by the bidder up to
auction a over total value of contracts awarded in a given administrative region and year. Demand (%)
is the total value of contracts awarded up to auction a as % of the total value of the contracts awarded
in a given administrative region of Quebec and year. Significance at 10% (∗), 5% (∗∗), 1% (∗∗∗) p < .01.
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6 Conclusion
Through the study of a case of market sharing agreements, I found evidence of coordi-
nation on the degree of head-to-head competition. I also quantified the extent to which
avoiding head-to-head competition represents a cost for public procurement. I have ana-
lyzed the participation and bidding behavior in auctions of the two largest firms bidding in
the provincial road paving procurement market in Quebec. Using the start of a police in-
vestigation into collusive behavior to capture the end of this cartel, I documented that the
two suspect firms were more likely to compete head-to-head and submitted significantly
lower bids after the police investigation was launched.
A structural model of entry and bidding with asymmetric bidders quantified the extent
to which colluding on the degree of head-to-head competition increased bids. If the firms
had kept competing head-to-head at the same rate as in the collusive period but had
stopped colluding on bids, bids would have increased by about 3.86% with respect to the
competitive scenario observed after the beginning of the police investigation.
This study is one of the first to document price and non-price collusion in a public
procurement setting. I show that multiplant firms that potentially compete in multiple
markets can share the market by i) avoiding competing against each other, and ii) fixing
prices. The results also demonstrate that collusion on a dimension other than prices, such
as the degree of head-to-head competition, is associated with higher procurement costs,
although these costs are lower compared to a situation where firms collude on prices.
Finally, I discuss several reasons why colluding firms may prefer to avoid head-to-head
competition in a context of a cartel that does not include all the firms in a market.
Reducing the cost for submitting a bid could provide a solution to stimulate com-
petition. The Ministry of Transportation, for example, requires all bidders to submit 5
or 10% of the submission as a warranty. This requirement makes entry costs high and
gives an incentive to large firms to coordinate their respective decisions to participate in
an auction. In addition, I demonstrate that antitrust authorities should investigate the
participation behavior of firms: if firms that are not in the cartel respond to competition,
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coordinating the participation behavior in auctions may be more likely to occur than
coordinating bids.
Another policy implication of my work is related to procurement policies. In some
countries, the need for a reduction in government expenditure has led to the creation of
centralized procurement agencies that award big contracts by aggregating the demand of
several public administrations. The centralization could give an incentive for multimarket
firms to refrain from bidding in one auction, expecting the other firm to do the same
in another auction. The implementation of market sharing agreements between firms
becomes thus more likely. This point has also been raised in a recent paper by Atella
and Decarolis (2019) in the context of multi-lot auctions for the procurement of medical
devices.
A sudden switch from collusion to competition could potentially worsen the ex post
procurement performance. After colluding firms stop coordinating, they may compete
head-to-head to a larger extent and submit more aggressive bids at the time of the award-
ing of the contract. Yet when executing the project, they may incur cost overruns. These
cost overruns increase the final procurement costs compared to the procurement costs
forecast at the time of the signing of the contract. This pattern is not, however, observed
in the data, reinforcing the assertion that stimulating competition through encouraging
bidder participation provides a tool to achieve not only a better ex ante, but also a better
ex post procurement performance.
This study comes with some caveats. First, the unavailability of precise estimated
values of the contracts could partially bias the estimates of the difference-in-difference
design for bids, although my results are robust to a different specification for the bids, as
shown in Table B.1 in Appendix B.1. Second, the relatively short sample period of a few
years makes it challenging to disentangle whether the geographic separation of asphalt
plants observed in some administrative regions of Quebec for the two suspected firms could
be associated with collusion rather than simple geographic differentiation. Although not
directly identifiable as collusion because of the unavailability of additional years of data,
such geographic differentiation does help multimarket firms to mitigate losses from the
collapse of a cartel, as shown in other studies (Chilet, 2018).
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Appendix A
Additional tables and figures
A.1 Other firms in the cartel?
The Canadian Competition Bureau is currently investigating 16 firms other than firms A
and B. They are typically smaller firms.
Table A.1: Summary statistics for suspected firms other than firms A and B
Pre (2007-2009) Post (2010-2015)
Number of bids per contract 0.86 0.82
Number of bids per contract (contracts with at least one cartel bid) 0.89 0.81
Average bid (% value) 85.21 74.99
Average bid (% value, contracts with at least one cartel bid) 82.88 74.38
Notes: Pre (2007-2009) refers to the period before the start of the police investigations. Post (2010-
2015) refers to the period after the start of the police investigations. Number of bids per contract is the
average number of bids of the suspected firms other than firms A and B out of total contracts. Number
of bids per contract (contracts with at least one cartel bid) is the average number of bids of the suspected
firms other than firms A and B in contracts that received at least one bid from either firm A or firm B.
Average bid (% value) is the average bid expressed in % of the mean value of the contract submitted by
suspected firms other than firms A and B. Average bid (% value, contracts with at least one cartel bid) is
the average bid expressed in % of the mean value of the contract submitted by the suspected firms other
than firms A and B in those contracts that receive at least one cartel bid.
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In Table A.2, I estimate a difference-in-difference by considering the suspected firms as
the treated group and all other bidders in the control group. Firms A and B are excluded
from the sample. While we observe a significant change in the average bid, the change in
the winning bids is not significant.
Table A.2: Diff-in-diff for bids over mean value of contract (%). Sample restricted to
other 16 suspected firms. Firms A and B are excluded.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep.Variable all bids all bids winning bids winning bids
Suspects×Post -8.042* -8.872** -4.124 -7.671
(4.300) (4.026) (7.606) (7.891)
Suspects 2.258 3.414 3.154 4.829
(3.718) (3.545) (6.786) (7.579)
Post -2.179 5.807 -5.046 8.330
(4.156) (9.039) (4.176) (11.61)
Distance (km) 0.0332 0.0662*
(0.0200) (0.0372)
Capacity (%) 0.0358 0.0241
(0.0430) (0.0883)
Value firm region (%) -0.173* -0.00996
(0.0896) (0.175)
Demand (%) 0.0957** 0.00147
(0.0445) (0.0547)
Admin Region effects No Yes No Yes
Year effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,362 1,362 388 388
R-squared 0.0129 0.0503 0.0115 0.0631
Average Outcome Pre 83.95 83.95 83.95 83.95
Notes: Standard errors clustered by Quebec administrative region and year in parentheses. Post
indicates whether the auction a is published after October 2009. Distance (km) is the driving distance
between the project location and the firm‘s closest plant to the project. Capacity (%) is the percentage
of total value of contracts won up to auction a over total value of contracts won in a given administrative
region and year. Value firm region (%) is the total value of contracts won by the bidder up to auction a
over total value of contracts awarded in a given administrative region and year (in percentage). Demand
(%) is the total value of contracts awarded up to auction a as % of the total value of the contracts
awarded in a given administrative region of Quebec and year. Significance at 10% (∗), 5% (∗∗), 1% (∗∗∗)
p < .01.
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A.2 Territorial allocation
Coordinating head-to-head competition in the period before the start of the police inves-
tigation in the treated group of auctions includes two types of effects: i) colluding firms
divide territories amongst themselves, and ii) colluding firms alternate their participation
in territories where they are both ”active” bidders. To find evidence of i), I examine
the participation behavior in an MRC. In particular, I look at those MRCs where in the
pre-investigation period only one of the two cartel firms bid. The outcome I consider is
the number of cartel bids in an auction.
Table A.3 reports the statistics for the treated and control groups. By construction,
in the treated and control groups, the average number of cartel bids is less than 1 in the
pre-investigation period. In the treated group of auctions, there has been a 37% increase
in the average number of cartel bids in the post-investigation period.
Table A.3: Number of cartel bids in an auction. Only MRCs with only one cartel firm
actively bidding in the pre-investigation period are considered.
Pre Post Post-Pre
TreatedAuction=1 0.907 1.240 0.333
TreatedAuction=0 0.849 0.833 -0.016
Post-Pre 0.058 0.407 0.349
As in the previous subsection, I investigate whether these results are robust with the
inclusion of other contract characteristics. The econometric specification is the following:
Ya = β0+β1TreatedAuctiona×Posta+β2TreatedAuctiona+β3Posta+β4Za+a (A.11)
where Ya is now the number of cartel bids in auction a. The variable TreatedAuction is
equal to 1 if the cartel firms are located within a 100 km radius around the project, 0
otherwise. The variable Post indicates if the auction was published after October 2009
and Za represents auction characteristics as above. The interest relies on the coefficient
β1.
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Table A.4 reports the results. The increase in the number of cartel bids in the treated
with respect to the control group of auctions is about 0.35 in a model that does not account
for contract characteristics (column 1). The inclusion of all contract characteristics does
not change the results. The observed increase in the number of cartel bids in the treated
group represents an increase by about 35% of the average number of cartel bids in the
pre-investigation period in the treated group.
Table A.4: Diff-in-diff for the number of cartel bids in an auction. Only MRCs where
only one of the cartel firms bid are considered.
(1) (2) (3)
Dep.Variable nbr.cartel bids nbr.cartel bids nbr.cartel bids
TreatedAuction×Post 0.349*** 0.336*** 0.315**
(0.105) (0.105) (0.137)
TreatedAuction 0.0579 0.00132 -0.228*
(0.0637) (0.0782) (0.119)
Post -0.0157 -0.0366 -0.155
(0.0945) (0.0923) (0.194)
N potential cartel bidders 0.223*** 0.156**
(0.0577) (0.0714)
N potential non-cartel bidders -0.0208 -0.0107
(0.0173) (0.0251)
Free capacity of cartel firms (%) -0.000172 0.000259
(0.00126) (0.00117)
Demand (%) -0.000772 -0.000515
(0.00148) (0.00149)
Admin Region effects No No Yes
Year effects No No Yes
Size project effects No No Yes
Observations 345 345 345
R-squared 0.127 0.166 0.374
Average Outcome Treated Pre 0.907 0.907 0.907
Notes: Standard errors clustered by Quebec administrative region and year in parentheses.
TreatedAuction*Year represents the interaction between TreatedAuction and a linear trend (Year). Post
is a dummy equal to 1 if the contract was published after October 2009. N potential cartel bidders is the
number of cartel bidders (firms A and B) bidding in at least one auction in a given MRC (municipalite´
re´gionale de comte´). N potential non-cartel bidders is the number of bidders (other than firms A and
B) bidding in at least one auction in a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale de comte´). Free capacity of
cartel firms (%) is the highest level of free capacity of cartel firms in a given administrative region and
year. Demand (%) is the total value of contracts awarded up to auction a as % of the total value of the
contracts awarded in a given administrative region of Quebec and year. Significance at 10%(∗), 5% (∗∗),
1%(∗∗∗) p < .01.
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A.3 Test common trend
Figure A.1: Average probability of head-to-head competition by year.
Table A.5: Test of common trend for the probability of head-to-head competition.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep.Variable prob.head-to-head prob.head-to-head prob.head-to-head prob.head-to-head
TreatedAuction×2008 0.247** 0.116
(0.0982) (0.0865)
TreatedAuction×2009 0.284** 0.207**
(0.126) (0.0855)
TreatedAuction×Year 0.000176*** 8.89e-05**
(3.16e-05) (3.77e-05)
Admin Region effects No Yes No Yes
Year effects No Yes No Yes
Size project effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 194 194 194 194
R-squared 0.159 0.353 0.0950 0.354
Average Outcome Treated Pre 0.354 0.354 0.354 0.354
P-value 0.802 0.214
Notes: Standard errors clustered by Quebec administrative region and year in parentheses.
TreatedAuction*Year represents the interaction between TreatedAuction and a linear trend (Year).
TreatedAuction×2008 represents the interaction between TreatedAuction and a dummy equal to 1 if
the auction was published in 2008. TreatedAuction×2009 represents the interaction between TreatedAuc-
tion and a dummy equal to 1 if the auction was published in 2009. p-value is the p-value resulting from
testing the equality of coefficients of TreatedAuction×2008 and TreatedAuction×2009. Significance at
10% (∗), 5% (∗∗), 1% (∗∗∗) p < .01.
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Figure A.2: Average number of cartel bids (bids of firms A and B) in an auction by year.
Table A.6: Test of common trend for the number of cartel bids in an auction.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep.Variables nbr.cartel bids nbr.cartel bids nbr.cartel bids nbr.cartel bids
TreatedAuction×2008 0.367** 0.667***
(0.168) (0.169)
TreatedAuction×2009 0.412** 0.609***
(0.175) (0.150)
TreatedAuction×Year 0.000263*** 0.000254***
(5.72e-05) (7.75e-05)
Admin Region effects No Yes No Yes
Year effects No Yes No Yes
Size project effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 194 194 194 194
R-squared 0.166 0.475 0.0956 0.492
Average Outcome Treated Pre 1.260 1.260 1.260 1.260
P-value 0.841 0.708
Notes: Standard errors clustered by Quebec administrative region and year in parentheses.
TreatedAuction*Year represents the interaction between TreatedAuction and a linear trend (Year).
TreatedAuction×2008 represents the interaction between TreatedAuction and a dummy equal to 1 if
the auction was published in 2008. TreatedAuction×2009 represents the interaction between TreatedAuc-
tion and a dummy equal to 1 if the auction was published in 2009. p-value is the p-value resulting from
testing the equality of coefficients of TreatedAuction*2008 and TreatedAuction*2009. Significance at 10%
(∗), 5% (∗∗), 1% (∗∗∗) p < .01.
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Table A.7: Test common trend for bids over mean value of the contract (%).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES all bids all bids winning bids winning bids
TreatedAuction×Year 0.00345 0.00729* 0.00259 0.00670
(0.00218) (0.00386) (0.00213) (0.00458)
Admin Region effects No Yes No Yes
Year effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 589 589 194 194
R-squared 0.00964 0.0716 0.00628 0.0829
Average Outcome Treated Pre 86.68 86.68 83.14 83.14
Notes: Standard errors clustered by Quebec administrative region and year in parentheses.
TreatedAuction×Year represents the interaction between TreatedAuction and a linear trend (Year). Sig-
nificance at 10% (∗), 5% (∗∗), 1% (∗∗∗) p < .01.
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A.4 Other figures
Figure A.3: Map of Canada (left) and of the Canadian province of Quebec (right)
(a) Canada (b) Quebec
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Appendix B
Robustness
B.1 Bids
Table B.1: Diff-in-diff for bids over upper bound of the value of the contract (%).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep.Variable all bids all bids winning bids winning bids
TreatedAuction×Post -10.38** -11.82** -9.030** -9.975**
(4.240) (4.669) (3.977) (4.446)
TreatedAuction 6.431** 11.81*** 5.259 10.69***
(3.161) (3.825) (3.234) (3.880)
Post 1.796 7.150 -1.014 5.479
(3.470) (6.390) (2.894) (5.171)
Distance (km) 0.0305** 0.0382*
(0.0141) (0.0196)
Capacity (%) 0.00817 0.0256
(0.0294) (0.0609)
Value firm region (%) -0.0671 -0.0119
(0.0450) (0.0908)
N potential cartel bidders -6.225** -3.456
(2.425) (2.103)
N potential non-cartel bidders 0.312 -0.318
(0.755) (0.671)
Demand (%) 0.0703* 0.0177
(0.0369) (0.0353)
Admin Region effects No Yes No Yes
Year effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,230 2,230 751 751
R-squared 0.0166 0.0517 0.0236 0.0540
Average Outcome Treated Pre 60.66 60.66 58.56 58.56
Notes: Standard errors clustered by Quebec administrative region and year in parentheses. Post
indicates whether the auction a is published after October 2009. Distance (km) is the driving distance
between the project location and the firm‘s closest plant to the project.Capacity (%) is the percentage of
total value of contracts won up to the auction a over total value of contracts won in a given administrative
region and year. Value firm region (%) is the total value of contracts won by the bidder up to auction
a over total value of contracts awarded in a given administrative region and year (in percentage). N
potential cartel bidders is the number of cartel bidders (firms A and B) bidding in at least one auction in
a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale de comte´). N potential non-cartel bidders is the number of bidders
(other than firms A and B) bidding in at least one auction in a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale de
comte´). Demand (%) is the total value of contracts awarded up to auction a as % of the total value of
the contracts awarded in a given administrative region of Quebec and year. Significance at 10% (∗), 5%
(∗∗), 1% (∗∗∗) p < .01.
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Table B.2: Diff-in-diff for bids over mean value of the contract. Auctions with only one
bidder are excluded (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep.Variable all bids all bids winning bids winning bids
TreatedAuction×Post -13.83** -14.66** -10.60* -11.49*
(5.968) (6.147) (5.703) (5.933)
TreatedAuction 6.715 11.87** 4.586 9.965*
(4.502) (5.247) (4.507) (5.274)
Post 2.472 10.45 -2.988 5.996
(5.030) (8.196) (4.216) (6.788)
Distance (km) 0.0336* 0.0291
(0.0181) (0.0280)
Capacity (%) 0.0294 0.0447
(0.0381) (0.0858)
Value firm region (%) -0.122** -0.0499
(0.0580) (0.136)
N potential cartel bidders -7.263** -4.941*
(3.096) (2.775)
N potential non-cartel bidders 0.784 0.475
(1.005) (0.910)
Demand (%) 0.0847* 0.0243
(0.0479) (0.0475)
Admin Region effects No Yes No Yes
Year effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,130 2,130 651 651
R-squared 0.0202 0.0573 0.0327 0.0626
Average Outcome Treated Pre 86.65 86.65 82.86 82.86
Notes: Standard errors clustered by Quebec administrative region and year in parentheses. Post
indicates whether the auction a is published after October 2009. Distance (km) is the driving distance
between the project location and the firm‘s closest plant to the project. Capacity (%) is the percentage of
total value of contracts won up to the auction a over total value of contracts won in a given administrative
region and year. Value firm region (%) is the total value of contracts won by the bidder up to auction
a over total value of contracts awarded in a given administrative region and year (in percentage). N
potential cartel bidders is the number of cartel bidders (firms A and B) bidding in at least one auction in
a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale de comte´). N potential non-cartel bidders is the number of bidders
(other than firms A and B) bidding in at least one auction in a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale de
comte´). Demand (%) is the total value of contracts awarded up to auction a as % of the total value of
the contracts awarded in a given administrative region of Quebec and year. Significance at 10% (∗), 5%
(∗∗), 1% (∗∗∗) p < .01.
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Table B.3: Diff-in-diff for bids over mean value of the contract controlling for realized
competition (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep.Variable all bids all bids winning bids winning bids
TreatedAuction×Post -13.12** -13.36** -11.12** -10.88*
(5.550) (6.157) (5.076) (5.837)
TreatedAuction 6.923 11.21** 5.205 10.99**
(4.334) (5.050) (4.227) (4.995)
Post 1.831 9.631 -1.993 7.565
(4.623) (7.795) (3.799) (6.297)
Distance (km) 0.0339* 0.0307
(0.0180) (0.0255)
Capacity (%) 0.0229 0.0294
(0.0385) (0.0779)
Value firm region (%) -0.117** -0.0255
(0.0578) (0.117)
n cartel bidders -3.903* -3.567
(2.312) (2.237)
n non-cartel bidders -0.0793 -1.690
(1.568) (1.310)
Demand (%) 0.0852* 0.0110
(0.0484) (0.0470)
Admin Region effects No Yes No Yes
Year effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,230 2,230 751 751
R-squared 0.0186 0.0493 0.0267 0.0570
Average Outcome Treated Pre 86.68 86.68 83.14 83.14
Notes: Standard errors clustered by Quebec administrative region and year in parentheses. Post
indicates whether the auction a is published after October 2009. Distance (km) is the driving distance
between the project location and the firm‘s closest plant to the project.Capacity (%) is the percentage of
total value of contracts won up to the auction a over total value of contracts won in a given administrative
region and year. Value firm region (%) is the total value of contracts won by the bidder up to auction a
over total value of contracts awarded in a given administrative region and year (in percentage). n cartel
bidders is the number of cartel bidders (firms A and B) bidding in the auction. n non-cartel bidders
is the number of bidders (other than firms A and B) bidding in the auction. Demand (%) is the total
value of contracts awarded up to auction a as % of the total value of the contracts awarded in a given
administrative region of Quebec and year. Significance at 10% (∗), 5% (∗∗), 1% (∗∗∗) p < .01.
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Table B.4: Diff-in-diff for bids over mean value of the contract controlling for firm effects
(%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep.Variable all bids all bids winning bids winning bids
TreatedAuction×Post -13.12** -13.68** -11.12** -11.53*
(5.550) (6.097) (5.076) (6.401)
TreatedAuction 6.923 13.32** 5.205 11.07*
(4.334) (5.319) (4.227) (6.124)
Post 1.831 10.81 -1.993 6.243
(4.623) (7.964) (3.799) (7.452)
Distance (km) 0.0344 0.0485
(0.0212) (0.0350)
Capacity (%) 0.0136 -0.00840
(0.0376) (0.0828)
Value firm region (%) -0.0466 0.0267
(0.0592) (0.128)
N potential cartel bidders -7.137** -2.025
(3.096) (3.378)
N potential non-cartel bidders 0.550 -0.710
(0.989) (0.904)
Demand (%) 0.0771 0.0308
(0.0484) (0.0513)
Admin Region effects No Yes No Yes
Year effects No Yes No Yes
Firm effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,230 2,230 751 751
R-squared 0.0186 0.0900 0.0267 0.117
Average Outcome Treated Pre 86.68 86.68 83.14 83.14
Notes: Standard errors clustered by Quebec administrative region and year in parentheses. Post
indicates whether the auction a was published after October 2009. Distance (km) is the driving distance
between the project location and the firm‘s closest plant to the project. Capacity (%) is the percentage of
total value of contracts won up to the auction a over total value of contracts won in a given administrative
region and year. Value firm region (%) is the total value of contracts won by the bidder up to auction
a over total value of contracts awarded in a given administrative region and year (in percentage). N
potential cartel bidders is the number of cartel bidders (firms A and B) bidding in at least one auction in
a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale de comte´). N potential non-cartel bidders is the number of bidders
(other than firms A and B) bidding in at least one auction in a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale de
comte´). Demand (%) is the total value of contracts awarded up to auction a as % of the total value of
the contracts awarded in a given administrative region of Quebec and year. Significance at 10% (∗), 5%
(∗∗), 1% (∗∗∗) p < .01.
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Table B.5: Diff-in-diff for bids over mean value of the contract (%). Treatment sample
only includes auctions where firms A and B compete head-to-head.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep.Variable all bids all bids winning bids winning bids
TreatedAuction×Post -16.15** -20.22** -14.89** -15.70**
(7.375) (8.822) (6.623) (7.773)
TreatedAuction 7.612 14.79 6.626 10.25
(6.135) (9.686) (5.722) (8.460)
Post 1.831 13.74 -1.993 10.90
(4.628) (9.397) (3.806) (7.933)
Distance (km) 0.0207 -0.0153
(0.0199) (0.0373)
Capacity (%) 0.0422 -0.0624
(0.0563) (0.114)
Value firm region (%) -0.153* 0.0423
(0.0841) (0.157)
N potential cartel bidders -5.513 -3.163
(4.134) (4.261)
N potential non-cartel bidders 0.102 -1.007
(1.270) (1.154)
Demand (%) 0.115* 0.102
(0.0659) (0.0668)
Admin Region effects No Yes No Yes
Year effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,388 1,388 476 476
R-squared 0.0230 0.0680 0.0303 0.0707
Average Outcome Treated Pre 87.37 87.37 84.56 84.56
Notes: Standard errors clustered by Quebec administrative region and year in parentheses. Post
indicates whether auction a was published after October 2009. Distance (km) is the driving distance
between the project location and the firm‘s closest plant to the project. Capacity (%) is the percentage
of total value of contracts won up to auction a over total value of contracts won in a given administrative
region and year. Value firm region (%) is the total value of contracts won by the bidder up to auction
a over the total value of contracts awarded in a given administrative region and year (in percentage). N
potential cartel bidders is the number of cartel bidders (firms A and B) bidding in at least one auction in
a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale de comte´). N potential non-cartel bidders is the number of bidders
(other than firms A and B) bidding in at least one auction in a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale de
comte´). Demand (%) is the total value of contracts awarded up to auction a as % of the total value of
the contracts awarded in a given administrative region of Quebec and year. Significance at 10% (∗), 5%
(∗∗), 1% (∗∗∗) p < .01.
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Table B.6: Diff-in-diff for bids over mean value of the contract (%). Treatment sample
only includes bids of firms A and B when they compete head-to-head.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep.Variable all bids all bids winning bids winning bids
TreatedAuction×Post -17.47** -20.26** -18.82*** -19.53**
(7.015) (8.456) (7.013) (8.617)
TreatedAuction 9.111 14.56 13.20** 19.16*
(5.724) (9.011) (5.949) (10.19)
Post 1.831 18.93** -1.993 9.679
(4.630) (9.382) (3.810) (11.92)
Distance (km) 0.0172 -0.0240
(0.0220) (0.0396)
Capacity (%) 0.0505 -0.0697
(0.0628) (0.139)
Value firm region (%) -0.129 0.0832
(0.0837) (0.172)
N potential cartel bidders -4.670 -1.226
(4.139) (4.570)
N potential non-cartel bidders -0.251 -1.894
(1.232) (1.333)
Demand (%) 0.0815 0.0815
(0.0588) (0.0806)
Admin Region effects No Yes No Yes
Year effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,011 1,011 386 386
R-squared 0.0209 0.0729 0.0275 0.0909
Average Outcome Treated Pre 88.87 88.87 91.13 91.13
Notes: Standard errors clustered by Quebec administrative region and year in parentheses. Post
indicates whether auction a was published after October 2009. Distance (km) is the driving distance
between the project location and the firm‘s closest plant to the project. Capacity (%) is the percentage
of total value of contracts won up to auction a over total value of contracts won in a given administrative
region and year. Value firm region (%) is the total value of contracts won by the bidder up to auction
a over the total value of contracts awarded in a given administrative region and year (in percentage). N
potential cartel bidders is the number of cartel bidders (firms A and B) bidding in at least one auction in
a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale de comte´). N potential non-cartel bidders is the number of bidders
(other than firms A and B) bidding in at least one auction in a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale de
comte´). Demand (%) is the total value of contracts awarded up to auction a as % of the total value of
the contracts awarded in a given administrative region of Quebec and year. Significance at 10% (∗), 5%
(∗∗), 1% (∗∗∗) p < .01.
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B.2 Different clustering of the standard errors
Table B.7: Diff-in-diff for the number of cartel bids in an auction and probability of head-
to-head competition. Standard errors clustered by administrative region in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep.Variable prob.head-to-head prob.head-to-head nbr.cartel bids nbr.cartel bids
TreatedAuction×Post 0.0999 0.222*** 0.0847 0.231*
(0.0647) (0.0365) (0.124) (0.119)
TreatedAuction 0.354*** -0.0377 0.528*** -0.0169
(0.0831) (0.0475) (0.147) (0.184)
Post 0.0155* -0.0222 0.0510 -0.0585
(0.00783) (0.0905) (0.0919) (0.144)
N potential cartel bidders 0.0970*** 0.262***
(0.0305) (0.0779)
N potential non-cartel bidders -0.00556 -0.0302*
(0.00980) (0.0153)
Free capacity of cartel firms (%) -0.000164 -0.000573
(0.000260) (0.00106)
Demand (%) -0.000403 -0.00114
(0.000379) (0.00110)
Admin Region effects No Yes No Yes
Year effects No Yes No Yes
Size project effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 751 751 751 751
R-squared 0.209 0.479 0.202 0.494
Average Outcome Treated Pre 0.354 0.354 1.260 1.260
Notes: Standard errors clustered by Quebec administrative region in parentheses. nbr cartel bids
indicates the number of cartel bids in an auction. prob head-to-head is a binary variable indicating
whether both cartel firms (firms A and B) bid in the auction. Post is a dummy equal to 1 if the contract
was published after October 2009. N potential cartel bidders is the number of cartel bidders (firms A
and B) bidding in at least one auction in a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale de comte´). N potential
non-cartel bidders is the number of bidders (other than firms A and B) bidding in at least one auction
in a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale de comte´). Free capacity of cartel firms (%) is the highest level
of free capacity (%) of cartel firms in a given administrative region and year. Demand (%) is the total
value of contracts awarded up to auction a as % of the total value of the contracts awarded in a given
administrative region of Quebec and year. Significance at 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
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Table B.8: Diff-in-diff for bids over mean value of the contract (%). Standard errors
clustered by administrative region in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep.Variable all bids all bids winning bids winning bids
TreatedAuction×Post -13.12** -14.77** -11.12** -12.93**
(5.379) (5.425) (4.839) (4.946)
TreatedAuction 6.923* 12.81** 5.205 12.41**
(3.314) (4.825) (4.215) (5.356)
Post 1.831 11.07* -1.993 9.116*
(2.810) (6.134) (2.309) (4.777)
Distance (km) 0.0364* 0.0356
(0.0179) (0.0285)
Capacity (%) 0.0237 0.0196
(0.0369) (0.0855)
Value firm region (%) -0.110 0.00534
(0.0636) (0.127)
N potential cartel bidders -6.713* -3.924
(3.761) (2.949)
N potential non-cartel bidders 0.543 -0.306
(1.331) (1.081)
Demand (%) 0.0818** 0.0151
(0.0348) (0.0472)
Admin Region effects No Yes No Yes
Year effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,230 2,230 751 751
R-squared 0.0186 0.0522 0.0267 0.0554
Average Outcome Treated Pre 86.68 86.68 83.14 83.14
Notes: Standard errors clustered by Quebec administrative region in parentheses. Post indicates
whether the auction a was published after October 2009. Distance (km) is the driving distance between
the project location and the firm‘s closest plant to the project. Capacity (%) is the percentage of total
value of contracts won up to the auction a over total value of contracts won in a given administrative
region and year. Value firm region (%) is the total value of contracts won by the bidder up to auction
a over total value of contracts awarded in a given administrative region and year (in percentage). N
potential cartel bidders is the number of cartel bidders (firms A and B) bidding in at least one auction in
a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale de comte´). N potential non-cartel bidders is the number of bidders
(other than firms A and B) bidding in at least one auction in a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale de
comte´). Demand (%) is the total value of contracts awarded up to auction a as % of the total value of
the contracts awarded in a given administrative region of Quebec and year. Significance at 10% (∗), 5%
(∗∗), 1% (∗∗∗) p < .01.
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B.3 Identification strategy
• Both cartel firms are closer to the project than the furthest potential participant in
the auction, and both are within a 90 km radius of the project location.
Table B.9: Diff-in-diff for the number of cartel bids in an auction and probability of
head-to-head competition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep.Variable prob.head-to-head prob.head-to-head nbr.cartel bids nbr.cartel bids
TreatedAuction×Post 0.117 0.236*** 0.0675 0.218*
(0.0817) (0.0573) (0.148) (0.130)
TreatedAuction 0.369*** -0.00612 0.587*** 0.0705
(0.0634) (0.0570) (0.129) (0.130)
Post 0.0140 -0.0292 0.0731 -0.0514
(0.00994) (0.110) (0.106) (0.164)
N potential cartel bidders 0.0917*** 0.252***
(0.0276) (0.0552)
N potential non-cartel bidders -0.00407 -0.0268
(0.00975) (0.0171)
Free capacity of cartel firms (%) -0.000117 -0.000450
(0.000423) (0.000792)
Demand (%) -0.000369 -0.00103
(0.000517) (0.000990)
Admin Region effects No Yes No Yes
Year effects No Yes No Yes
Size project effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 751 751 751 751
R-squared 0.247 0.487 0.243 0.502
Average Outcome Treated Pre 0.369 0.369 1.295 1.295
Notes: Standard errors clustered by Quebec administrative region and year in parentheses. nbr cartel
bids indicates the number of cartel bids in an auction. prob head-to-head is a binary variable indicating
whether both cartel firms (firms A and B) bid in the auction. Post is a dummy equal to 1 if the contract
was published after October 2009. N potential cartel bidders is the number of cartel bidders (firms A
and B) bidding in at least one auction in a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale de comte´). N potential
non-cartel bidders is the number of bidders (other than firms A and B) bidding in at least one auction
in a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale de comte´). Free capacity of cartel firms (%) is the highest level
of free capacity (%) of cartel firms in a given administrative region and year. Demand (%) is the total
value of contracts awarded up to auction a as % of the total value of the contracts awarded in a given
administrative region of Quebec and year. Significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***) p < .01.
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Table B.10: Diff-in-diff for bids over mean value of the contract (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep.Variable all bids all bids winning bids winning bids
TreatedAuction×Post -9.554* -11.10* -8.833* -9.848*
(5.574) (6.007) (5.090) (5.565)
TreatedAuction 2.820 7.039 2.090 7.071
(4.485) (5.267) (4.329) (4.991)
Post -0.866 8.414 -3.810 6.453
(4.481) (8.456) (3.644) (6.786)
Distance (km) 0.0358** 0.0357
(0.0176) (0.0249)
Capacity (%) 0.0275 0.0244
(0.0383) (0.0754)
Value firm region (%) -0.117** -0.00643
(0.0565) (0.111)
N potential cartel bidders -6.145** -3.341
(3.020) (2.620)
N potential non-cartel bidders 0.424 -0.421
(0.984) (0.848)
Demand (%) 0.0839* 0.0165
(0.0468) (0.0463)
Admin Region effects No Yes No Yes
Year effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,230 2,230 751 751
R-squared 0.0179 0.0488 0.0276 0.0519
Average Outcome Treated Pre 85.47 85.47 82.12 82.12
Notes: Standard errors clustered by Quebec administrative region and year in parentheses. Post
indicates whether the auction a was published after October 2009. Distance (km) is the driving distance
between the project location and the firm‘s closest plant to the project. Capacity (%) is the percentage of
total value of contracts won up to the auction a over total value of contracts won in a given administrative
region and year. Value firm region (%) is the total value of contracts won by the bidder up to auction
a over total value of contracts awarded in a given administrative region and year (in percentage). N
potential cartel bidders is the number of cartel bidders (firms A and B) bidding in at least one auction in
a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale de comte´). N potential non cartel bidders is the number of bidders
(other than firms A and B) bidding in at least one auction in a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale de
comte´). Demand (%) is the total value of contracts awarded up to auction a as % of the total value of
the contracts awarded in a given administrative region of Quebec and year. Significance at 10% (∗), 5%
(∗∗), 1% (∗∗∗) p < .01.
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• Both cartel firms are closer to the project than the furthest potential participant in
the auction, and both are within a 110 km radius of the project location.
Table B.11: Diff-in-diff for the number of cartel bids in an auction and probability of
head-to-head competition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep.Variable prob.head-to-head prob.head-to-head nbr.cartel bids nbr.cartel bids
TreatedAuction×Post 0.108 0.190*** 0.156 0.241**
(0.0802) (0.0461) (0.138) (0.120)
TreatedAuction 0.324*** -0.0651 0.412*** -0.158
(0.0622) (0.0416) (0.113) (0.116)
Post 0.0118 0.00766 0.00516 -0.0524
(0.00822) (0.109) (0.0887) (0.160)
N potential cartel bidders 0.104*** 0.282***
(0.0283) (0.0554)
N potential non-cartel bidders -0.00778 -0.0350**
(0.00987) (0.0173)
Free capacity of cartel firms (%) -0.000165 -0.000656
(0.000427) (0.000810)
Demand (%) -0.000389 -0.00118
(0.000520) (0.00102)
Admin Region effects No Yes No Yes
Year effects No Yes No Yes
Size project effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 751 751 751 751
R-squared 0.174 0.471 0.153 0.488
Average Outcome Treated Pre 0.324 0.324 1.194 1.194
Notes: Standard errors clustered by Quebec administrative region and year in parentheses. nbr
cartel bids indicates the number of cartel bids in an auction. prob head-to-head is a binary variable
indicating whether both cartel firms (firms A and B) bid in the auction. Post is a dummy equal to 1 if
the contract is published after October 2009. N potential cartel bidders is the number of cartel bidders
(firms A and B) bidding in at least one auction in a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale de comte´). N
potential non-cartel bidders is the number of bidders (other than firms A and B) bidding in at least one
auction in a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale de comte´). Free capacity of cartel firms (%) is the highest
level of free capacity (%) of cartel firms in a given administrative region and year. Demand (%) is the
total value of contracts awarded up to auction a as % of the total value of the contracts awarded in a
given administrative region of Quebec and year. Significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) p < .01.
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Table B.12: Diff-in-diff for bids over mean value of the contract (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable all bids all bids winning bids winning bids
TreatedAuction×Post -11.73* -12.39* -11.10* -12.51*
(6.665) (7.126) (6.260) (6.893)
TreatedAuction 4.387 7.800 3.997 9.069
(5.710) (6.732) (5.577) (6.663)
Post 1.397 9.885 -1.455 9.343
(5.659) (8.809) (4.948) (7.292)
Distance (km) 0.0365** 0.0354
(0.0173) (0.0250)
Capacity (%) 0.0293 0.0332
(0.0380) (0.0756)
Value firm region (%) -0.119** -0.0137
(0.0559) (0.111)
N potential cartel bidders -5.932* -3.308
(3.046) (2.726)
N potential non-cartel bidders 0.383 -0.440
(0.956) (0.822)
Demand (%) 0.0831* 0.0127
(0.0465) (0.0456)
Admin Region effects No Yes No Yes
Year effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,230 2,230 751 751
R-squared 0.0184 0.0493 0.0281 0.0538
Average Outcome Treated Pre 85.66 85.66 82.47 82.47
Notes. Standard errors clustered by Quebec administrative region and year in parentheses. Post
indicates whether the auction a is published after October 2009. Distance (km) is the driving distance
between the project location and the firm‘s closest plant to the project.Capacity (%) is the percentage of
total value of contracts won up to the auction a over total value of contracts won in a given administrative
region and year. Value firm region (%) is the total value of contracts won by the bidder up to auction
a over total value of contracts awarded in a given administrative region and year (in percentage). N
potential cartel bidders is the number of cartel bidders (firms A and B) bidding in at least one auction in
a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale de comte´). N potential non-cartel bidders is the number of bidders
(other than firms A and B) bidding in at least one auction in a given MRC (municipalite´ re´gionale de
comte´). Demand (%) is the total value of contracts awarded up to auction a as % of the total value of
the contracts awarded in a given administrative region of Quebec and year. Significance at 10%(∗), 5%
(∗∗), 1%(∗∗∗) p < .01.
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Appendix C
Data
C.1 Dataset
Two sources were used to construct the dataset: the official tendering website of the Que-
bec government (SEAO) and data from the open data portal of the Quebec government.
On the tendering website, I open ”Advanced search” to look for contract between 2007
and 2015 with the code identifying paving job (72131701). The name of the public buyer
is Ministe`re des Transports du Que`bec and I choose contracts awarded and concluded.
Then, I scrape these contracts.
I use the open dataset to obtain information on whether the job is focused mainly on
paving. If not, the contract is eliminated from the dataset.
C.2 Data cleaning
Distance variable: This variable represents the distance between the location of the
project and the closest asphalt plant of each firm to the project. The location of the project
is the first location announced in the contract. The location of the plant is found on the
map given by the Ministry of Transport. From the addresses, I then construct a Python
script that uses Google API to transform the addresses into coordinates (latitude and
longitude). Then, using the STATA command globdist and georoute (georoute requires
opening a HERE account), I find the shortest distance, the driving distance, and the time
distance from the project.
62
C.3 Definition of the variables used in the dataset
Table C.1: Definition of the main variables used in the dataset
Main outcomes
Variable Definition Notes
Number of cartel bids Number of cartel bids in an auction Auction-level variable
Head-to-head competition Probability that firms A and B bid in the same auction Auction-level binary variable
Bid Bid expressed as % of the mean value of the contract
Bidder and auction-level
variable
Bidder characteristics
Capacity (%)
Total value of contracts won in a given administrative region
and year up to auction a as % of the total value
of contracts won in a given administrative region and year
The value is the amount
for which the contracts are signed.
Bidder-auction specific
Value firm region (%)
Total value of contracts won in a given administrative region
and year up to auction a as % of the total amount
of contracts awarded in a given administrative region and year
The value is the amount
for which the contracts are signed.
Bidder-auction specific
Distance (km)
Driving distance in km from the closest asphalt plant of the firm
to the paving project location
STATA command georoute.
For paving project location
I use the first location
in the call for tender.
Bidder-auction specific
Auction characteristics
Treatment
Equal to 1 if both cartels are closer to the project than
the furthest potential participant in the auction and both are within
100km of the auction
Auction-level binary variable
Post Equal to 1 if the auction was published after 23rd October 2009 Auction-level binary variable
n cartel bidders Number of actual cartel bidders (firms A and B) Auction specific variable
n non-cartel bidders Number of actual non cartel bidders (different from firms A and B) Auction specific variable
N potential cartel bidders
Number of potential cartel bidders (firms A and B).
A firm is a potential bidder if it bids at least once in a given MRC
For a given MRC, there is one
value of this variable
N potential non-cartel bidders
Number of potential bidders different from firms A and B.
A firm is a potential bidder if it bids at least once in a given MRC.
For a given MRC, there is one
value of this variable
Demand (%)
Total value of contracts awarded up to auction a as % of the total value
of contracts awarded in a given administrative region and year
The value of the contract
is the amount for which
the contracts are signed
Administrative region effects Dummies for administrative region of location of the paving project
Year effects Dummies for year
Size project effects Dummies for project size
I use the upper bound of
the value of the contract
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